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Analysis of U.S. Scientists' Opposition to SDI

40050429a Beijing ZIRAN BIANZHENGFA
TONGXUN [Journal of Dialectics of Nature] in Chinese
No 1, 10 Feb 89 pp 33-34

[Article by Gu Yanxi 6253 3601 6007: "The Movement Whereby American Scientists Are Opposing SDI"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]

IV. Conclusions

This paper has described the movement whereby American scientists are opposing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). But it must be mentioned that it is certainly not the case that all American scientists unanimously oppose the Star Wars plan. There is no lack of supporters for the Star Wars plan within American scientific circles, and several famous scientists are included among them. Both supporters and those in opposition have used various opportunities to make known their views. The American MODERN PHYSICS journal printed a large number of letters from readers as a debate on this problem. As it happens, in comparison with those scientists who oppose the Star Wars plan, there are not a lot of scientists supporting this plan, nor have they attracted many followers, and so this paper has concentrated on describing the movement whereby scientists are opposing the Star Wars plan. But is there nothing of value in the Star Wars plan? I would like to offer my own opinion.

The Star Wars plan grew up under the influence of political, military, scientific, and economic factors, but foremost were military reasons, which have been the primary generating factors behind Star Wars. Implementation of the Star Wars plan is sure to raise the real military strength of the United States, and this would push the Soviet Union toward improving its own military strength, further threatening world peace. It is certainly for this reason that scientists are opposing the Star Wars plan. But at the same time, the Star Wars plan is a large scale scientific research project that involves several high technology fields, as for example microelectronics and supercomputers, high energy lasers, new materials, and optoelectronics. Implementation of the Star Wars plan would be certain to bring developments in those high technology fields. It is estimated that high technology will have a greater and greater share of future technology markets. For this reason, these high technology developments would not only be accompanied by technological advantages, but would also generate enormous economic results. In fact, other countries are even more concerned about the significance of this aspect of Star Wars, not the military aspect. Because these high technology developments will allow the United States to grow rapidly in the next century while maintaining its position as a powerful nation. It is in this regard that the Star Wars plan is a greater threat to other countries. As a direct result of this plan, various countries have quickly

formulated plans to develop high technology. The Western European countries have joined to carry out the European Cartel plan, Japan has drawn up an outline by which to invigorate science and technology policies, and member nations of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance headed by the Soviet Union have drawn up a comprehensive program for advances in science and technology by the year 2000. China, too, has responded. Because China does not have the base by which to develop high science and technology, we have only made a partial adjustment of the science and technology system. But developing high technology has been made a long-term development goal for the state (see the report by Zhao Ziyang at the 13th CPC National Congress). These things are different from the U.S. Star Wars plan in that the development of high technology by these countries is primarily for civilian purposes.

Historically speaking, much advanced technology has been developed from military needs, only after which does it see broad civilian use. For example, the Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb led to the human application of atomic energy, and computers were developed out of the need to calculate artillery trajectories. The Star Wars plan is currently underway, but can the high technology that will develop from it be used widely in peacetime applications? We will have to wait and see.

Since the Star Wars plan can stimulate the growth of advanced science and technology, why would American scientists be so adamantly opposed to it? In my opinion, rather than say that the scientists are opposing the particular plan that is Star Wars, it would be better to say that they are opposing Reagan's pro-war attitude. Everyone knows that Reagan was a hard-liner regarding the Soviet Union, and that he constantly advocated resisting the Soviet Union. During his presidency, the U.S. military strength increased enormously. His advocacy of the Star Wars plan was a military competition with the Soviets in the field of strategic defense. This was contrary to the desires for peace among the majority of American scientists, and so met with their ardent opposition. We cannot help but wonder whether if advanced science and technology were being developed under a Star Wars plan developing for civilian purposes, would then the American scientists be so ardently opposed?

LIAOWANG Views U.S., Soviet Arms Control Differences

HK0106021589 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 21, 22 May 89

[“Special” dispatch from Moscow by Zhu Chengjun (4555 2110 6511): “Soviet-U.S. Relations as Viewed From James Baker’s Trip to Moscow”]

[Excerpts] The long-suspended Soviet-U.S. dialogue was finally resumed following U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s visit to Moscow. This is the first time that James Baker has visited the Soviet Union as the new U.S. secretary of state.

At the invitation of the Soviet Union, James Baker paid an official visit to the Soviet Union from 10 May to 11 May and held talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze, which was the first of its kind since George Bush took office as President of the United States. [Passages omitted]

If it is said that one of the remarkable achievements made by both sides during James Baker's visit to Moscow is that both the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to resume a series of arms control talks in June of this year, so the exchange of opinions between the United States and the Soviet Union on the question of disarmament was no doubt a focal point in the talks between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet officials. The results of the talks between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet officials show that both sides still have differences with regard to some major issues.

First, although the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that it is high time for both sides to draft a treaty on reducing the offensive strategic weapons of both sides by 50 percent, the United States only expounded its stand on this issue in a very general way and was only willing to discuss all the details concerning this issue at the upcoming Soviet-U.S. arms control talks to be held in Geneva in June of this year. The Soviet side stressed that only by fully implementing the anti-missile defense treaty signed by both sides in 1972 will it be possible for both sides to reduce their offensive strategic weapons by 50 percent. The Soviet side also demanded that a solution to the issue of limiting long-range sea-based cruise missiles be written into the draft treaty on reducing the offensive strategic weapons of both sides by 50 percent and also put forward specific measures of limiting and installing surveillance systems in both countries. Moscow's worry is not unreasonable. This is because some 70 percent of U.S. strategic weapons are deployed on submarines, which carry a total of more than 600 independently targeted multiple warheads. These nuclear submarines sail in all the seas surrounding the Soviet Union, posing a much bigger threat to the Soviet Union than the U.S. land-based heavy missiles.

Nevertheless, to reach an agreement on reducing strategic nuclear weapons is the common desire of both countries. About a year ago, just before Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev held their fourth round of summit talks in Moscow, it had been widely speculated that the United States and the Soviet Union would reach an agreement on reducing strategic nuclear weapons. Later on, because both sides offered virtually different interpretations of the anti-missile defense treaty and had differences over the question of verification, the Soviet-U.S. talks collapsed. However, since the nuclear arsenals in both countries have reached saturation point, in order to reduce their excessive stockpiles of nuclear weapons, lower the level of their nuclear confrontation, and reduce

their huge financial deficits, it is very likely that the United States and the Soviet Union will be compelled to seek a compromise solution to the question in the foreseeable future.

Second, the Soviet side made it clear that it will not agree to lumping together the question of reducing tactical nuclear weapons with the question of reducing conventional armed forces, and believed that the U.S. insistence on modernizing NATO's tactical nuclear weapons will inevitably undermine the stability of the present military and strategic situation in Europe. However, the U.S. side held that the safety and defense of West Europe is of the utmost importance to NATO. Under the existing circumstances, West Europe must retain a certain number of tactical nuclear missiles. The U.S. side also held that only after the Soviet Union has unilaterally reduced its own tactical nuclear weapons so as to strike a basic balance between the two military blocs in this regard will it be possible for the talks proposed by the Soviet Union be held. During his meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, Mikhail Gorbachev unexpectedly announced that the Soviet Union will unilaterally withdraw some 500 tactical nuclear warheads it has deployed on the territories of its East European allies in 1989 and is also planning to withdraw all the nuclear warheads it has deployed on the territories of its East European allies between 1989 and 1991 on condition that the United States also carries out a parallel withdrawal of its nuclear warheads from the territories of its West European allies. By making clear this position, the Soviet Union actually "embarrassed" the United States and intensified the dispute between the United States and its West European allies. What the Soviet Union worries about most at present is a new round of the arms race caused by the modernization of NATO's tactical nuclear missiles. During his meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, Mikhail Gorbachev told him that not only the Soviet Union and the East European countries, but also the whole of Europe are worried about the "modernization" program put forward by the United States.

Third, the Soviet Union agreed to take the lead in reducing tanks, artillery, and combat armored vehicles on condition that NATO agrees to reduce its tactical combat planes and combat helicopters, because tactical combat planes and combat helicopters are also powerful weapons with strong mobility. The Soviet Union also proposed troop reductions during the talks. However, the United States "did not make any progress" with regard to its position on this question.

By comparison, since they hold almost identical views on the question of total prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and on the question of restriction and prohibition of nuclear tests, the United States and the Soviet Union are likely to make some progress on these two questions in their upcoming talks. [Passages omitted]

'News Analysis' on Bush Task at NATO Summit
OW2705154089 Beijing XINHUA in English
1440 GMT 27 May 89

[“News Analysis: Bush Is Facing Arduous Job at NATO Summit (by Wei Guoqiang)”—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, May 26 (XINHUA)—U.S. President George Bush left here today for Europe to attend a NATO summit in Brussels May 29 - 30 to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the alliance.

The summit is going to be held against the backdrop of improved East-West relations and intense internal relations among the alliance.

Analysts here believe that the current quarrel between Washington and Bonn over short-range nuclear forces (SNF) will be the issue dominating the discussions at the summit, an issue that virtually reflects the difference of views on Western strategy toward the Soviet Union.

On the SNF issue, the Federal Germany, for its own national interests, opposes modernization of the NATO aging Lance missiles, mainly deployed on Federal German soil. Instead, it demands that the superpowers start talks on reduction of the nuclear forces.

The United States initially rejected Federal Germany's demand, saying that the talks would lead to the elimination of nuclear deterrence in Europe.

Earlier this week, the U.S. Administration reportedly agreed in principle with Bonn's demand, but still insisted that the SNF talks should be linked with a substantial reduction of the Warsaw Pact conventional forces.

However, Federal Germany seems not to go along with such a vague approach and wants more U.S. commitment on the issue.

The White House indicated that up to now, no compromise has been achieved between the two countries.

The SNF issue involves not only the United States and Federal Germany, but other NATO members as well. Britain, Canada and the Netherlands stand on the U.S. side, while most of the other European NATO members side with Federal Germany.

In addition, the recent Soviet proposal for reduction of its SNF arsenal also added fuel to the flame of split within the alliance.

Under such circumstances, it seems unlikely that Bush will win support for his position on SNF at the summit, originally designed to demonstrate solidarity of the alliance.

Earlier this week, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker warned that the dispute would not be “resolved at all costs” by the United States just to ensure a harmonious summit.

His remarks indicated that the United States is not going to make major concessions on the issue at the summit.

On the more significant question of what common strategy the alliance should adopt in dealing with the Soviet Union, President Bush also faces a challenge.

NATO is a product of the “cold war” era. In the past decades, West European countries, which have relied on the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” and forces to confront the Warsaw Pact, have had identical views with the United States on the strategy toward the Soviet Union.

However, the Soviet Union has in recent years made a series of peace initiatives, which the West Europeans believe are helpful to peace and security in Europe.

The U.S.-Soviet agreement on elimination of medium and short range nuclear missiles and the Soviet openness and economic reform have also helped them see that the Soviet Union is not as formidable as it was.

Many European countries, Federal Germany in particular, want to take advantage of the favorable situation featured with detente to further develop their relations with the Soviet Union.

But, the Bush administration believes that the future of the Soviet Union is still uncertain, and the West should, instead of helping Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in his reform, force him to make more concessions so as to substantially reduce the Soviet threat.

The differences between the NATO countries on both sides of the Atlantic over the approach toward the Soviet Union not only reflect their differing interests, but also mirror the sentiment of West European countries for independent decisionmaking in terms of East-West relations.

Federal German President Richard von Weizsaecker said the other day: “We are not a great power, but we are also not a playing ball for others.”

“Western Europe and the whole continent are decisively dependent on our contribution. Our political weight derives from our central location, the special situation of Berlin, the size of our population, our productivity and our stability,” he said.

The Federal German president's remarks reflect the potentially momentous changes in Europe's political order, which the United States doesn't want to see.

6 June 1989

Facing the sentimental changes in Western Europe, Bush has reportedly brought a proposal for cutting back 10 percent of U.S. troops in Europe to the summit in order to offset the Soviet peaceful offensive and mobilize its allies to press the Soviet Union for more concessions.

However, it seems that Bush will not be able to obtain his goal easily.

RENMIN RIBAO on NATO Policy Adjustment
HK2905083189 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
27 May 89 p 3

[“International Outlook” column by correspondent Wei Wei (7614 8343): “The Turning Point Will Bring About a Readjustment—Written on the Eve of the NATO Summit”]

[Text] Brussels, 26 May—There are now only 4 days before the opening of the NATO summit. The allies on the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean are stepping up preparations and holding frequent consultations in order to bridge the internal chasm, and to enable the 16 government heads to maintain their superficial unity when they get together.

Events in the past few days have showed that the positions of Washington and Bonn have gradually moved closer, and the possibility of reaching a compromise between the two sides have increased. The United States has showed a flexible attitude and does not continue to oppose the holding of negotiations with the Warsaw Pact on the issue of short-range missiles; but Washington still maintains a prerequisite, that is, only after the talks on conventional forces make irreversible progress will it consider the short-range missile talks. West Germany has also given up its position of holding talks with the Warsaw Pact to reduce and eventually eliminate all short-range missiles “as soon as possible.” Bonn now agrees with the U.S. proposal that the talks on short-range missiles be linked with the talks on conventional forces. Analysts here hold that it will not be too difficult to formulate a “political declaration” acceptable to all NATO members. In the past 1 to 2 years, in various NATO joint declarations and communique, the controversial issues were always mentioned in ambiguous terms, thus people with different opinions could explain them in different ways.

However, even if a compromise for saving face is worked out and a “harmonious” atmosphere is created, the profound differences inside NATO can still not be eliminated. The controversies over such issues as whether the short-range nuclear weapons should be modernized or not, and whether talks on these weapons should be held with the Soviet Union or not, will still continue, and the debate over the “general strategic conception” closely related to these issues will not cease.

The main purpose of the coming summit meeting is not to celebrate the previous achievements but to embark on the strategic adjustment in light of the major changes in East-West relations.

When openly challenging the United States on the issue of short-range missiles, West Germany assumed a tough attitude never seen in NATO’s internal relations in the past. Some other West European countries have also gradually inclined to the position of West Germany. This tendency reflects a major change under way in NATO’s internal relations. West Europe, especially West Germany, has won a stronger position inside NATO. As the economic backbone of the European Community and a big power in world trade, West Germany has begun to consider the political and defense interests of the West from a geopolitical angle, and take a more independent position rather than continuing to tamely follow another big power. A NATO analyst said that it may be ridiculous to say that Europe is now contending with the United States for NATO’s leadership and seeking independence in defense affairs, because this is not realistic; however, Europe is indeed striving for a bigger say on the issues concerning its immediate interests and trying to shift the relationship between the allies on the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean to a more equal foundation. This is the general tendency. The United States will have no alternative but to make certain concessions on the issue of the short-range missile talks in light of this tendency.

Over the past 40 years, NATO has always pursued a “deterrent strategy” and various nuclear weapons constitute the main deterrent means. However, the correctness of the deterrent strategy has been doubted by more and more people in West Europe. This has forced the Western strategists to reconsider and revise NATO’s strategy. A NATO official said that what it needs at present is a strategy with “minimum deterrent and maximum cooperation.” So the military function of NATO is shrinking, as East-West cooperation will play a bigger role. NATO will gradually dilute its military color and will adapt its image to the dialogue between East and West Europe, thus opening up various channels for political and security cooperation.

Of course, the adjustment of NATO’s strategy will be a “flexible, prudent, and gradual process.” It will not only be constrained by various internal factors, but will be constrained, to a large extent, by the situation in the Soviet Union and East Europe. This will be a long, tortuous, and even painful process. The coming NATO summit will at most express the intention of making such an adjustment. However, as long as the world situation continues to change from a bipolar pattern into a multipolar pattern, NATO will certainly have to continuously adjust its internal relations and its strategy against the East, and will have to expand dialogue and cooperation with the Soviet Union and East Europe. The adjustment will thus be carried on and will break through the “Yalta pattern” established after the end of World War II.

Thus, the coming NATO summit meeting is very likely to mark a major turning point in the annals of this organization and in the adjustment of its long-term strategy.

Foreign Ministry Comments on NATO Summit
OW0106082589 Beijing XINHUA in English
0748 GMT 1 Jun 89

[Text] Beijing, June 1 (XINHUA)—China sincerely hopes that the two major military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, will drastically cut their conventional armaments in Europe through earnest negotiations, so as to facilitate the easing of the situation in Europe, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today.

Li Jinhua made the remark in response to a question requesting comments on the recently concluded NATO summit at today's weekly news briefing.

The NATO summit has ended with a coordinated NATO position on the question of conventional disarmament in Europe and a few proposals, she said.

XINHUA 'Analysis' of NATO Summit Outcome
OW0106033789 Beijing XINHUA in English
0119 GMT 1 Jun 89

[“News Analysis: A Breakthrough in NATO Policy Harmonization (by Liu Yongsheng”—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Brussels, May 31 (XINHUA)—The adoption of a declaration on NATO's political strategy and “comprehensive concept” on defense and disarmament is an obvious breakthrough among NATO's major issues, and will exert a profound impact on the European and world situation.

A two-day NATO summit, which ended here on May 30 with a temporary agreement on the controversial problem of short-range nuclear forces (SNF), was widely described as “starting under clouds, ending in sunshine,” and is of far-reaching significance to the future of NATO.

The agreement, which involved concessions mainly by Britain and Federal Germany and paved the way for new arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, is also a great boost to NATO after weeks of disagreement.

It came after the proposal made by U.S. President George Bush to cut U.S. troops in Europe by 20 percent. The U.S. proposal, the most drastic move in disarmament by the West in the post-war era, was immediately applauded by the allies.

The proposal was considered not only as an active response to the series of arms cut offensives by the Soviet Union in recent months, but also as an impetus to

strengthen the solidarity and cohesion of the alliance. What is more important is that it “adhered to and advanced NATO's basic strategy.”

Before the summit, NATO was shrouded in the clouds of uncertainty. The differences on short-range nuclear forces between the U.S., Britain and Germany were seen as likely to block the success of the meeting.

However, the U.S. proposal not only met partially the demands of Germany in the dispute, but also paved the way for the successful adoption of the long-awaited comprehensive concept.

The 17-page comprehensive concept set out aims for East-West relations, security and arms control, and laid down basic principles for NATO's overall policies in the 1990s. The allied leaders made a strong statement in the document on the role of NATO, extending from its defense and military strategy functions to political and even economic issues in its relations with the East. The leaders pointed out that while facing the threat, they must grasp the opportunities provided by history.

The results of the summit gave signs that the NATO allies have come closer on many of the essential issues concerning defense and security policies, and that the hope of Western countries to keep internal unity and cohesion so as to maintain their own security and development is growing.

This summit, especially with the adoption of the comprehensive concept, is the strategic blueprint for NATO in the 1990s.

Militarily, NATO will continue to maintain a credible defense with an appropriate mixture of conventional and nuclear forces, while putting special stress on the role of the nuclear deterrent.

Based on that, dialogue with the East will be strengthened with aims to cut the Warsaw Pact's conventional and tactical forces' superiority. At the same time, it will give more play to the function of “the European pillar,” and maintain the U.S.-European defense link.

Politically, NATO will further strengthen its collective role, promote its contacts with the East European countries in the political sphere, and try to bring the East toward Western “values” so as to finally set up a “new order in an undivided Europe.”

Economically, NATO will take advantage of the reforms in East European countries to promote trade and economic relations with the East, and try to westernize Eastern economies.

Moreover, no matter how successful and significant the summit is, it was unable to solve all the difficulties or smooth all the differences within NATO. With the further development of East-West relations, NATO is bound to meet more problems.

'Roundup' on U.S., FRG Resolution of Short-Range Missile Dispute

*OW0106064489 Beijing XINHUA in English
0605 GMT 1 Jun 89*

[("Roundup: Washington and Bonn Rebuild Confidence (by Hu Yongzhen)"—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Bonn, May 31 (XINHUA)—U.S. President George Bush's 24-hour visit to Bonn ended today amid an atmosphere of relaxed tension and new confidence between the two countries.

Bush visited Federal Germany after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had reached a compromise on upgrading short-range weapons at the May 29-30 summit in Brussels.

Since the treaty on eliminating medium-range nuclear missiles, the Western allies have been quarrelling over the short-range missiles issue.

The United States and Britain wanted to negotiate with the Soviet Union on the issue only when they had made substantive progress on conventional disarmament. Federal Germany wanted to move on the issue immediately and preferred to negotiate at once.

The White House disagreed with Bonn on the third zero option, while Bonn, although it did not hope for its immediate adoption, did not want to shut the door on the third zero option indefinitely, which is aimed at completely eliminating short-range nuclear missiles.

The United States agreed to postpone making any decision on modernization of short-range missiles until 1992, but asked Bonn to support its research program for new weapons. Bonn said the research program was Washington's own business and support from the allies would in fact mean support for the modernization of short-range missiles.

The quarrel reflected different interests and interpretations in the changing world situation.

At the summit, Bush eased the tension when he suggested speeding up conventional arms talks with the Warsaw Pact, a stance that led to the compromise.

According to Bush's scenario, short-range missile talks would start when the West and East reached agreement on conventional arms and put the agreement into effect within six months to a year.

Both the U.S. and Federal Germany were satisfied with the solution because it responded both to the U.S. position of "conventional talks first, short-range missiles second," and to Bonn's request for negotiations on short-range missiles as soon as possible. But the quarrel had cast a shadow over American-Federal German relations.

An American columnist had criticized Bonn for "trying to establish the fourth Reich on the ruins of NATO." A Federal German newspaper called the quarrel over short-range missiles just the "tip of the iceberg," indicating there are a wide range of differences in diplomacy and trade policy between the two countries.

Early this year, the Libyan chemical factory incident created a crisis in U.S.-Federal German relations.

Most notably, however, the two countries have differed strongly in their approaches to the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, Washington apparently believes it is important to strengthen ties with its Western ally. Bush's visit was aimed at reducing those differences while making a show of unity and re-establishing mutual confidence.

Bush and Helmut Kohl, the Federal chancellor, stressed their "close and solid" friendship at a press conference last night. Kohl said Federal German-U.S. relations were of great significance to his country in future. Bush said he did not believe their relations have ever been better.

At the banquet in honor of the U.S. President, Kohl looked back on the Bonn-Washington friendship and suggested promoting improved relations through exchanges of young people and individual contacts.

In his speech today, Bush called Federal Germany "a partner who plays a leading role." The two leaders went on a cruise along the Rhine River in an atmosphere that could only be described as harmonious.

Bush's Federal German trip after the agreement on short-range missiles turned a new page in U.S.-Federal German friendship. But the new relations cannot be guaranteed indefinitely.

Whether agreement on conventional arms can be reached in the next six to 12 months, and what will happen in 1992 when the decision on modernizing short-range missiles has to be made, are two questions that remain unanswered.

Commentary On Bush's Arms Reduction Proposal
HK0206095189 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO
in Chinese 2 Jun 89 p 3

[“Commentary” by staff reporter Zhang Qixin (1728 0796 2500): “Bush’s Arms Reduction Proposal and Its Influence”]

[Text] President Bush put forth an arms reduction proposal at the NATO summit held at the end of May, which is the first of this kind since he came to power. The proposal on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe was welcomed by the NATO states and Western press circles. It enabled the NATO summit to turn danger into safety and helped close the rifts among the NATO countries.

With the development of the European situation, different views have developed within NATO on the relaxation of East-West relations and the future of disarmament. The summit was once faced with a severe test. The test for the United States was especially great. First, during the half year since Bush became U.S. President, the Soviet Union has taken the initiative on the question of disarmament several times. When meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker on 11 May, Soviet leader Gorbachev put forth a new proposal on the reduction of arms in Europe. Since the United States has not put forth relevant countermeasures for a long time, it has been criticized both at home and abroad. Second, in the past month or so, a dispute over short-range missiles has broken out among the NATO countries, particularly between the United States and West Germany. This is a dispute with profound and lasting influence. It casts a shadow over the NATO summit. Soon after that, many people began to talk about the possible outcome of the summit and the leading position of the United States in the Western alliance. The development of situation forced the Bush administration to make a decision. It was under such circumstances that Bush put forward his arms reduction proposal.

In this arms reduction proposal, Bush affirmed the concession made by the Soviet Union and put forth some concrete proposals, such as reducing the number of aircraft of both sides, reducing the number of their troops in Europe, and advancing the timetable for negotiations. But what has produced the greatest influence on the NATO summit is that the United States has changed its stand and agreed to have army personnel and combat planes included in the domain of disarmament. This makes the positions of East and West closer and is in keeping with the aspirations of the West European allies. At the same time, the United States has agreed to hold talks with the Soviet Union on short-range missiles after an agreement is reached and put into effect on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe. Therefore, the demand of West Germany for “early” negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on short-range missiles is satisfied. Other NATO allies have also made concessions. They agree to maintain the

existing deterrent strategy and make only a “partial reduction” of short-range missiles. This is, in reality, a negation of the “third zero option.” Thus, the NATO countries have finally reached a compromise on some major issues.

Judging from the negotiations on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe, Bush’s proposal, like the new proposal of the Soviet leader, will also facilitate the process of negotiations. THE NEW YORK TIMES held that the new proposals of both the United States and the Soviet Union “have enabled East and West to get on a road for reaching an agreement on maintaining military balance in Europe.”

The main characteristic of Bush’s new proposal is that it has changed NATO’s previous position of “reducing arms before reducing personnel and aircraft” and has come to agree with the Soviet demand for simultaneously reducing military personnel and aircraft. It has even proposed to reduce NATO’s existing aircraft by 15 percent and to reduce the number of both U.S. and Soviet troops equally to 275,000. This shows that the proposals of the United States and the Soviet Union are coming closer to each other. But on some other concrete matters, such as the reduction of the types of aircraft, there are still differences between both sides. Moreover, with a total of 23 countries are involved in the European disarmament, it is complicated work to turn the disarmament proposals into a disarmament scheme and to work out supervision and inspection regulations. Therefore, it is generally believed that it may be “over optimistic” for Bush to think that an agreement can be reached in 6 to 12 months.

The disarmament proposal put forth by Bush is an important measure in the new administration’s Soviet policy. Undoubtedly, it will produce some positive effect on U.S.-Soviet relations, but judging from the Bush administration’s Soviet policy, which was put forward after making a general review of U.S.-Soviet relations, the attitude of the United States is still on the side of prudence. According to this policy, the United States will continue to test the new thinking of the Soviet Union on a series of questions. U.S. newspapers revealed that the “bold actions” in disarmament were taken by the Bush administration after many setbacks. The top-level leaders did not respond to Gorbachev’s new proposal until they had made a careful analysis of it. When explaining Bush’s arms reduction proposal recently, Baker said this “does not mean that prudence and realism have been abandoned.” It seems that in the future the United States will work out more countermeasures to solve realistic problems in its relations with the Soviet Union and that no violent and great changes will take place.

**XINHUA ‘Analysis’ on Bush Disarmament
 Proposal**

**OW0206040789 Beijing XINHUA in English
 0031 GMT 2 Jun 89**

[“News Analysis: Bush’s Disarmament Proposal—a Stone to Kill Three Birds (by Wei Guoqiang”—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, June 1 (XINHUA)—U.S. President George Bush made a new conventional disarmament

proposal at the NATO summit in Brussels Tuesday—a proposal seen here as a move to use one stone to kill three birds.

Under the proposal, the United States and the Soviet Union will cut its troops so that each side will have 275,000 personnel stationed in Europe.

The cuts would fall heavily on the Soviet Union, which would have to reduce their forces by about 325,000, while the United States would only reduce about 30,000, or 20 percent of U.S. combat strength, but only 10 percent of overall U.S. strength in Europe.

Bush suggested that NATO and the Warsaw Pact should each reduce their assault and transport helicopters, and land-based combat aircraft by 15 percent. In the past, the United States refused to negotiate with the Soviet Union the cutbacks of aircraft, which NATO has the superiority.

Bush demanded that an agreement on the conventional arms reduction as he proposed should be concluded within a year and the reduction be completed by 1992 or 1993.

Compared with Gorbachev's target date for an agreement in 1997, Bush's initiative seems to be a bolder step forward on the way to reduce tensions in Europe.

However, analysts here believed that taking the reality into consideration, one will see that Bush made the proposal for three purposes.

First, Bush wants "to compete with Gorbachev for the laurel of peacemaker" and win over the hearts and minds of West European people, whom the United States thinks are deeply impressed by the Soviet peace offensive.

Second, Bush made the proposal at a time when the United States and West Germany are trapped in a rift over the fate of short-range nuclear forces (SNF), which threatened the unity of the alliance.

Although the United States had agreed in principle, before the NATO summit, that talks between superpowers on the SNF reduction would start after substantial cutbacks of Warsaw Pact conventional forces are made,

West Germany, which believed that it is too late for the talks if conventional disarmament talks proceed in accordance with Gorbachev's timetable, had rejected the U.S. offer.

Evidently, Bush's proposal, which may shorten the time length for the conventional disarmament if accepted by the Soviet Union, is designed to satisfy West Germany to some degree, thus avoiding an open quarrel at the summit and shifting the focus from SNF issue to conventional arms reduction.

Third, since Bush took office in January, more than 4 months have passed. But, his administration failed to make any major initiatives in dealing with foreign affairs, especially the relations with the Soviet Union, which has put forward peace proposals one after another in the past months.

The "slow start" of the administration has aroused complaint or even criticism in the United States.

By making the proposal, analysts said, Bush intended to tell the American people that he is capable of checking Gorbachev's peace offensive and taking the initiative in his own hands instead of only responding to the call from Gorbachev in a negative manner.

Currently, Bush seems to have attained his goals, as his proposal has won support from U.S. allies, who described it as "the right thing to do" and "very positive" ideas. In the United States, the proposal was hailed as a "opening shot" to "seize the initiative" from Gorbachev.

It was also well received in the Soviet Union. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze also praised it as "an important step" toward the right direction.

The question now is whether an agreement on the reduction can be reached within a year as Bush suggested.

Technically, the conventional arms reduction is much more complicated than nuclear disarmament because it involves destruction of various weapons, the location of troops deployment and rearrangement of the demobilized personnel. In addition, verification of the reduction is also complicated.

However, one thing is certain, that Bush's proposal will help accelerate the disarmament process to some degree, at least in a sense of narrowing the gap between the two superpowers on their conventional disarmament positions.

BULGARIA

Bulgarian Delegate on Vienna Talks Proposal
*AU2205105289 Sofia ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME
in Bulgarian 19 May 89 p 4*

[Statement by Ambassador Lyuben Petrov, leader of the Bulgarian delegation to the Vienna talks, for ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME, on 18 May in Vienna]

[Text] The proposal that was submitted on the level of the Warsaw Pact and NATO Armed Forces and conventional weapons after the initial reductions in the region from the Atlantic to the Urals envisages: quantity of personnel—1.3 million persons; strike fighters of the front (tactical) air force—1,500; combat helicopters—1,700; tanks—20,000; artillery, 100-mm and larger caliber—24,000 units; armored personnel carriers—28,000 units.

In the next few days our countries will submit proposals on the quantity of armed forces and conventional weapons in the various regions and countries, as well as on the armed forces and weapons deployed outside the borders of the national territories.

The introduction of the proposals was received by NATO as a constructive step that will give the talks a more purposeful character, and will allow the working out of a schedule moving toward implementing the mandate.

A businesslike atmosphere prevails at the talks of the 23 countries. An emphasized interest and willingness are evident on the part of all delegations to achieve practical results as soon as possible. As far as the Warsaw Pact member countries are concerned, they already demonstrated their readiness to work for the success of the talks through the unilateral measures on reducing their armed forces and weapons.

At the present pace of work it is realistic to anticipate that next year the delegations can proceed and work out the first agreements, as well as achieve within 5-6 years a lower level of armed forces and weapons, something which in the past we expected to achieve toward 2000.

However, everything depends on when the existing differences in the sides' positions are eliminated.

The NATO representatives still insist on reducing only three kinds of weapons—tanks, artillery, and combat equipment—and do not wish at this stage to negotiate about such destabilizing weapons as the combat air force and combat helicopters, as well as about reducing personnel.

Naturally, if our countries accepted this approach we could quickly reach an agreement. However, such an agreement would mean in essence unilateral disarmament of the Warsaw Pact, because only those weapons

would be reduced in which the Warsaw Pact has an advantage, while the weapons in which NATO has an advantage would remain intact.

Finally, there already is an agreement in principle to create working groups, which will discuss in detail every specific proposal. In other words, we are already proceeding toward the most essential part of the talks.

Warsaw Pact Appeal to NATO Titled 'Realistic'
*AU2605172389 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO
in Bulgarian 24 May 89 p 5*

[Editorial article: "For the Sake of Mutual Security"]

[Text] Realistic, specific, and totally feasible—this is how we can evaluate the proposals contained in the appeal of the Warsaw Pact member states to the NATO member states.

Parting from the new realities of our contemporary world and recalling the historical experience of World War II, the authors of this new initiative propose to take advantage of the present opportunity to fully overcome the consequences of "cold war" in Europe and the world. The proposal is based on the development of the all-European process, whose main goal it is to eliminate military confrontation and to strengthen security and mutually advantageous cooperation.

The appeal addressed to the NATO member countries on the eve of their summit meeting scheduled to take place in Brussels by the end of this month once more launches the bold idea of simultaneously disbanding the two military blocs—and as a first step—to dissolve their military organizations. These will create difficulties, but they can and should be overcome. The joint efforts and actions of all states, regardless of their allegiance to either of the two blocs, are required in order to implement this goal. The Warsaw Pact member states propose a new concept of security based on a constant alleviation of military confrontation and reduction of armaments until the danger of war has been fully eliminated. Along with the disarmament process that should encompass all types of armaments and armed forces, we will build up the measures of consolidating mutual confidence and security. The Vienna negotiations are called upon to play an important role in this process. Their goal is to reduce armed forces to the level of defense sufficiency and to overcome the outdated cliches in our opinions about each other.

The appeal of the Warsaw Pact member states to the NATO member countries represents an important political factor at the moment when NATO is discussing and preparing its strategy for the nineties, and continues to rely on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Discussions related to the modernization of nuclear tactical weapons in Europe are only part, albeit an important part, of a broad discussion about the future military organizations in the West. In this situation the constructive nature of

6 June 1989

the Warsaw Pact member states appeal is even more evident. It points out once more the support for the additional proposals on a drastic reduction of the two blocs' armed forces and armaments by 1996-97 which were submitted by the USSR at the Vienna negotiations. The appeal also confirms the proposals on regional measures aimed at reducing the capability for sudden attacks, as well as on including all means of waging war, which have remained outside the framework of the disarmament dialogue. The authors of the appeal attach particular importance to the readiness expressed by the Soviet Union to withdraw all nuclear weapons deployed on the territories of their allies by 1991, provided that the United States should adopt a reciprocal measure.

In their topical and realistic document the Warsaw Pact member states do not restrict their proposals to the military sector alone. They adopt initiatives on the development of relations in other spheres of interstate relations—such as the economic, trade, scientific, and technical sectors, ecology, culture, human rights, and others. The proposals on expanding mutual contacts in the military sector, on exchanging information and delegations are of particular importance in this respect.

The state and government leaders of NATO member states will gather for their regular meeting within a few days. Along with their internal problems, they will also discuss the appeal for joint action addressed to them by the Warsaw Pact member states. The future of the political dialogue aimed at security and peace in Europe and the world will greatly depend upon the way in which they respond.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Force Limitation Proposal Submitted in Vienna

Proposal Sets Limit for NATO, Warsaw Pact
LD2305132989 Prague CTK in English
I235 GMT 23 May 89

[Text] Vienna May 23 (CTK correspondent)—Head of the Czechoslovak delegation to the Vienna discussions on conventional armed forces in Europe Ambassador Ladislav Balcar submitted here today on behalf of the Warsaw Treaty states a proposal providing for the upper limit of forces of the two groupings.

The measures should be realized within five to six years in all six categories proposed by the Warsaw Treaty states, he said.

CSSR's Baclar Speaks
AU2405154689 Bratislava PRAVDA
in Slovak 19 May 89 p 7

[CTK report: "Contribution by CSSR Delegation Head"]

[Text] Vienna (By CTK reporter)—The Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe continued yesterday [18 May] with a plenary session. The representatives of 23 member states of the two military alliances

participating in this disarmament forum are currently considering the projects submitted by the Warsaw Pact and NATO, which should lead to an agreement.

The scope that is currently being opened for the activities of individual work groups should also help to make the course of the talks more dynamic. Oleg Grinevskiy, head of the Soviet delegation, yesterday came up with a proposal which further elaborates the project submitted by the Warsaw Pact states on setting numerical ceilings for all main destabilizing categories, i.e. for troop strengths, the tactical airforce, and also combat helicopters, tanks, guns, armored personnel carriers, and combat infantry vehicles.

Ladislav Balcar, head of the CSSR delegation, spoke in support of the Soviet proposal, calling it a significant constructive step toward preparing the future agreement. The realization of this step, he said, signified the achievement of the main purpose of current negotiations—to consolidate stability and security in Europe. The CSSR delegation head particularly underscored that it is essential to set an upper limit not only for military technology, but also for troop strengths. He said that troops and armament are an indivisible whole, an inseparable and simultaneously extremely important part of conventional armed forces. Their typical feature is their ability to conquer and retain territory. That is why we deem it essential not only to conduct negotiations about this category, but also to anchor its reduction and limitation in specific form. We believe that the reduction of military personnel cannot be left to the functioning of some automatic, unspecified mechanism, the Czechoslovak ambassador stressed, and continued: On the one hand, NATO states say that armament reduction must inevitably lead to a reduction of personnel, while on the other hand they do not want to do so by limiting the numerical strengths of armed forces by means of firm final upper limits.

If no upper limit is set for the troops, then certain dangerous destabilizing effects can appear. This could result in the released troops spilling over into categories not included in the agreement, and thus in the creation of new asymmetries, Ladislav Balcar said.

Polish Tank Manufacturer Cuts Production
AU2405100289

[Editorial Report] Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech on 23 May on page 6 carries a 1,500-word article by Pavol Minarik, the paper's correspondent in Warsaw, entitled "An Armaments Factory Puts on Plain Clothes." The article deals with the author's undated visit to the "formerly secret premises" of the "Bumar" Mechanical Plant in Labedy near Gliwice, which manufactures military equipment.

Minarik quotes Ryszard Jankowski, general director of the plant, as having told him that, since its founding 38 years ago, the plant's main production program consisted of "production for the needs of the defense industry," starting with the T-34 and T-54 tanks, "up to the most modern T-72's." Speaking about the impact of the "declining demand for new tanks and similar military technology" on the "Bumar" plant, Minarik says: "Last year already, the production of tanks in Lebedy declined 30 percent. Orders for this year cover barely one-third of the combine's production capacity. Next year the management of the enterprise reckons with another decline of special production by roughly one-half."

In the body of the item, Minarik discusses the plans of the "Bumar" management to switch the distribution between production for the defense industry and civilian production from the former 90 to 10 ratio to a 10 to 90 ratio. He dwells on the difficulties connected with the future use of the plant's "mostly modern and highly productive" equipment and with keeping its 13,000 staff employed. He mentions that the management intends to concentrate on the production of cranes, excavators, and mine loaders, all of them products for which there is demand in Poland and abroad, and that it would like to cooperate with "Czechoslovak partners from Martin, Dubnica, Brno, and elsewhere" with whom it has cooperated in the production of military equipment. According to Minarik, the Poles are particularly interested in Czechoslovak hydraulics and axles.

Delegate at Vienna Talks Presents New Proposal
AU2605153189 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
24 May 89 p 1

[CTK dispatch: "Vienna Negotiations: Specification of Warsaw Pact Proposals"]

[Text] Vienna—At the Tuesday [23 May] session of the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe, CSSR Ambassador Ladislav Balcar presented on behalf of the Warsaw Pact countries a proposal defining the upper levels of forces which the states of the two organizations should be allowed to have.

The Czechoslovak representative stated that the proposed reduction to the set levels should take place in stages during a period of 5-6 years in all six categories proposed by the Warsaw Pact countries. The proposed levels include the armaments of active combat units and also armaments in military depots.

At the same time this addition to, and specification of, the proposal made by the Warsaw Pact countries is aimed at making the work of the Vienna forum more dynamic, so that the agreements reached there would become a reality in the near future, the head of the Czechoslovak delegation said.

Ambassador Oleg Grinevskiy, head of the Soviet delegation, then submitted a proposal on setting the upper level of the conventional armed forces and armaments of the NATO and Warsaw Pact states which are deployed beyond the borders of their own country. This applies to the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France, Canada, and other NATO states.

Withdrawal of Soviet Troops, Tanks Reported
AU2905105689 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
25 May 89 p 1

[“pal,sl”-signed report: “Tank Battalion Back in the USSR”]

[Text] Prague (our correspondents)—As we already reported on Tuesday, 23 May, the relocation of a tank battalion of a motorized rifle guards regiment back to the Soviet Union has begun at the Bohosudov Krupce railroad station in the Teplice District. Until now 887 Soviet soldiers and 264 automobiles of various types have returned home from the CSSR. On Wednesday [24 May], at exactly 1430, that number increased by 23 T-22 tanks and 42 men when the military transport from Bohosudov crossed the Czechoslovak state border in Cierna nad Tisou. This year a total of 1,500 Soviet soldiers will leave the CSSR, 192 tanks will be transported away, and 20 warplanes will be withdrawn.

Bush’s Connecticut Speech Heralds ‘Radical Turn’
AU2905195589 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
26 May 89 p 7

[CTK, “zr” dispatch: “Radical Turn; U.S. President’s Foreign Political Statement”]

[Text] Washington—In his latest foreign political speech, delivered during graduation at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut, on Wednesday [24 May], U.S. President George Bush welcomed the recent Soviet proposal on the reduction of weapons, tanks, and artillery in Europe.

According to this latest Soviet proposal, the number of tanks in each country should be reduced to 14,000; the number of guns to 17,000; and the number of armored personnel carriers to 18,000.

Bush’s announcement is being called a radical turn of government; in fact, only last week the government spokesman sharply, even abusively condemned the new Soviet proposals as a “propaganda trick.” “Our aim,” George Bush said, “is nothing less than to eliminate the possibility of war in Europe.” Brent Scowcroft, presidential national security adviser, said that by this Wednesday speech George Bush wanted to set a positive signal. “The President felt that his approach to date seemed far too negative, so that now he wants to make a more positive impression,” Scowcroft said.

According to the U.S. Department of State, the new element in the Soviet proposal is that it accepts specific limits for the strengths of individual kinds of weapons—as was proposed by the United States, but has so far been rejected by the USSR.

However, the positive aspects alternate with absurdities in the U.S. President's speech. He claimed, for instance, that "we are living at a time which is observing the final chapter of the communist experiment."

He also said that the United States and its allies "cannot rely on strategic weapons alone", but must develop other arms systems. He stressed that the United States intends to continue the development of space arms and to shift the MX and Midgetman strategic missiles from underground silos to mobile carriers.

G. Bush declared that he welcomes M. Gorbachev's proposals and the latest developments in the Soviet Union. He stated that the U.S. Government intends to make use of every opportunity to develop more stable relations with the USSR.

U.S. President Bush's Arms Cut Proposal Viewed

East-West Strategy, Internal Differences Cited *LD2805223789 Prague International Service in English 1900 GMT 28 May 89*

[Text] President George Bush has ended his visit to Italy and is now in Brussels to attend the NATO summit session to mark the alliance's 40th anniversary. He met with Belgium Premier Wilfried Martens to discuss the session and U.S.-Belgian relations. Assessing the 3-day visit, Radio Prague's Petr Pravda has this comment:

[Pravda] The visit was dominated by the NATO summit in Brussels in two respects: future NATO strategy in East-West relations, and differences within the Atlantic Alliance on short-range missiles in Europe. On the first point he reasserted his recent statement in New London, Connecticut that the United States would not apply cold war methods against the Soviet Union. In this connection, it is expected that Mr Bush would announce the lifting of the ban on high-technology exports to the Soviet Union and the 10-percent cut in the American troops' strength in Europe.

There is a question, of course, whether President Bush will not use this offer as the lever to assert the introduction of new American nuclear weapons in the NATO arsenal in Europe. Whether the offer is not designed to pacify America's allies and prevent a further rift within the alliance with the deployment of the new American short-range nuclear missiles in the Western Europe. [sentence as heard] This seems to be indicated by the call

made by the Italian premier for a flexible and constructive bridging of this issue. Thus it may be expected that some NATO members who are still wavering may eventually accept such a compromise rather than to further widen the existing rift.

The question remains of whether the exchange of a cut in the American troops strength for acceptance of new missiles offers the best bargain.

Further Comment

*LD2905211189 Prague International Service
in English 1900 GMT 29 May 89*

[Text] At the NATO summit under way in Brussels President Bush has proposed a 20-percent cut in the numbers of U.S. combat troops in Europe as part of a four-point plan scheduled for negotiations with the Warsaw Treaty. He also proposed a timetable he worked out under which an agreement of the Vienna talks on conventional weapons could be reached within 6 to 12 months. President Bush also said his country was prepared to lift its embargo on advanced technology to the Soviet Union. According to local observers the president had submitted his proposals following wave of criticism by its NATO allies that the United States did not react properly to the Soviet peace initiative.

Commenting on President Bush's fresh proposal Radio Prague's news analyst notes that at the first sight it is obvious that President Bush uses different yardsticks for different categories of weapons. For instance, the Warsaw Treaty has superiority in tanks, so that the President requires both sides to have an equal number of them. On the other hand NATO has not more combat helicopters and planes and here the president calls for only a 15 percent cut, that means to maintaining the present imbalance to the benefit of the West. The U.S. proposal does not include the remaining nuclear weapons in Europe, nor does it include their carriers. Hence it is too little for President Bush's first initiative which he himself described as revolutionary. It is evident that the new U.S. Administration could no longer ignore the offensive peace proposals made by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Nevertheless, in their next initiative the United States and its allies must go deeper and not avoid the most dangerous categories of weapons.

Bush's Intentions in Brussels Questioned

*LD2805081189 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
0730 GMT 28 May 89*

[Commentary by Jiri Cebrovsky]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] What will future developments be, how will we live in future years? This is a natural question, which perhaps everyone asks themselves. For Europe, where there is the highest number of weapons in the world and where there are the two most powerful military blocks it is a cardinal question. Will we rid ourselves of weapons, both nuclear and conventional

or will we live with them? This week the countries of the Warsaw Pact issued an appeal. They propose to overcome the results of the cold war and at the same time to disband both military political alliances. The appeal can be understood as an attempt to remove confrontational stereotypes which were being created between both alliances since they came into being. The important thing now is how our proposal will be understood by the North Atlantic pact [NATO]. Will it reply tomorrow at its summit meeting in Brussels or will it diffuse the appeal to a number of question marks and difficulties in the way which is so routinely used by NATO representatives so that in the end the proposal will come off the table. Will U.S. President Bush push through a modernization of nuclear tactical missiles at the Brussels meeting or will he realistically and wisely evaluate the Soviet proposals for the liquidation of these weapons, by way of talks, with his allies?

The U.S. President, who is very reserved and careful on questions of arming and disarmament, allegedly intends to announce in Brussels a reduction in the number of U.S. troops in Europe of up to 10 percent. That is about 34,000 U.S. soldiers who could be returning home. Is this just a tactical move intended to reduce the significance of the Soviet proposals and give the U.S. President back the face of the creator of peace, or is it an honestly and seriously intended proposal aimed at the goal of ridding Europe of weapons? The forthcoming Brussels meeting of the pact can give the answers to some of the questions.

CSSR Correspondent Reports Bush Proposals
AU3105104789 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
30 May 89 pp 1, 7

[“Milan Madr, CTK”-signed Brussels dispatch: “A Mixture of the Old and the New; The U.S. President Has Submitted a Disarmament Program”]

[Excerpts] Brussels (from our special correspondent and CTK)—A 2-day summit meeting of representatives of the 16 NATO countries, held to mark the 40th anniversary of NATO’s founding, opened in the pact’s Brussels headquarters on Monday [29 May]. [passage omitted] The opening speech was delivered by Manfred Woerner, NATO secretary general. In the course of the morning session, U.S. President George Bush put forward a 3-point disarmament proposal.

Woerner stressed that the pact’s aim remains “to overcome the status quo while maintaining the hard-won peace and freedom.” He evolved this idea, which evidently contains an element of interference in the internal affairs of other states, further when he said that “our task is to actively shape events. We not only welcome the change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, we will encourage and make full use of it. We will hold out to the East the offer of our cooperation with unceasing incentives and encouragements for reform..., and will reward those who have the courage to make a tough choice.” In

a speech that was full of old and antiquated cliches, he claimed that the pact must retain strong defense and a firm, reliable deterrent force. In his words, NATO has to maintain conventional and nuclear armaments at a level that will support the indivisibility of its security. “Nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantee of the strategy of war prevention,” he said.

President Bush presented a 3-point disarmament proposal, which—as the office of the White House press secretary contends in a written statement issued in Brussels—represents the most far-reaching Western disarmament proposal in the field of conventional arms control presented in the postwar period.

The first point coincides in parts with the proposals which the Warsaw Pact member states put forward in Vienna a few days ago. It sets a ceiling on the number of tanks (20,000 each for NATO and the Warsaw Pact), armored personnel carriers (28,000 for each side), and artillery weapons (between 16,000 and 24,000 for each side, depending on the solution of the problem of defining artillery weapons). The eliminated weapons are to be destroyed.

In the second point Bush recommends that the framework of conventional arms control be expanded so as to include, for the first time, all combat aircraft and helicopters of the ground forces. Each side should reduce their number to a level 15 percent below NATO’s present strength.

In this point, Bush meets half-way the justified criticism of socialist countries, which have been pointing out that NATO constantly emphasizes their superiority in tanks while leaving its own marked superiority in aircraft and helicopters out of consideration. However, the proposal disregards the air force and helicopters in the services of NATO states’ naval forces.

The third point concerns the reduction of ground and air forces of the United States and the Soviet Union deployed outside their national territories to roughly 275,000 men for each state. Finally, both sides are to accelerate their timetable for achieving agreements at the Vienna conventional disarmament talks so that agreement can be reached within 6 months up to a year and the reduction can be carried out up to 1992 or 1993.

The question of the modernization of nuclear short-range missiles remains the summit’s bone of contention. A special working commission at a lower level has been set up, whose task is to find a way out of this situation. [passage omitted]

The remaining part of the afternoon session was devoted to East-West relations. According to a British spokesman, the highest NATO representatives were exchanging opinions on, and experience from, their visits to socialist countries.

The first day of the NATO summit thus showed, among other things, that the United States has arrived at the opinion that it can no longer let the Soviet Union's peace offensive go unanswered. The speeches' rhetoric, their strong ideological anticommunist orientation, and the overtly expressed intentions to interfere in internal developments in the socialist countries unmistakably show, however, that the NATO leopard cannot change his spots and remains under the sway of the past.

Disarmament Proposals at NATO Summit Viewed

No Mention of Tactical Missiles

LD3005090389 Bratislava Domestic Service
in Slovak 0500 GMT 30 May 89

[Michel Berko report from Brussels—recorded]

[Excerpts] The NATO summit under way in Brussels no doubt has a special flavor. The U.S. disarmament proposals delivered yesterday by President Bush are limited to conventional weapons. In spite of this, a Soviet television correspondent called them stimulating and interesting.

Nevertheless, the proposal does not mention a single word on the most discussed question: tactical missiles. When differences still existed among NATO's 16 member states, the United States made possible talks on tactical weapons with the Soviet Union conditional on reaching an agreement at the Vienna talks on conventional weapons, while the FRG and other countries insisted that it was enough to reach a rough draft of a future agreement. The NATO foreign ministers reached a compromise after all. Our correspondent Michal Berko reports from Brussels:

[Begin Berko recording] [passage omitted] According to the latest news coming from with delegation circles, the foreign ministers reached an agreement: there will be talks on short-range missiles with the Warsaw Pact. It is not yet known though to what extent the adopted working document includes the possibility of holding talks with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact on eliminating all nuclear ammunition in Europe.

According to the first information available, the adopted working document envisages the opening of talks on eliminating short-range missiles to be linked with President Bush's proposal dealing with conventional weapons, which he delivered yesterday. This means that the talks on short-range missiles will begin only after an agreement in Vienna is reached and implemented. More details will be announced probably only after today's meeting of the highest representatives, who are to approve this working document. [end recording]

Documents, Content Questioned

LD3005223289 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1630 GMT 30 May 89

[Text] A 2-day NATO summit ended in Brussels today. Representatives of the 16 countries of the alliance adopted two main documents: a global concept in the sphere of disarmament and control of armaments, and a declaration on the current situation in the world. I asked Michal Berko, our special correspondent in Brussels, to report further:

[Berko] The two documents, which were adopted at the end of 2 days of deliberations by the highest representatives of the 16 countries of the alliance, represent a mixture of the old and new.

The joint statement admits that Europe and the world are changing rapidly. As for the development in the socialist countries, they want to support it above all where the changes resemble their vision. Further changes in the USSR, in particular, are linked by them with possibilities of improving the relations between East and West. Many questions were evoked by the statement, which says that future orientation of the policy of the alliance should be aimed at overcoming the division of Europe. Justifiably, many saw in this respect the initiative of the FRG Government, just as in proposals for cooperation between East and West in economy, trade, the humanitarian sphere, or ecology.

Apparent disappointment was represented by the actual results in the question of short-range missiles. The NATO states conditioned their talks with the Warsaw Pact, first by adopting the plan by President Bush in conventional weapons, and second by a previous unilateral reduction of short-range missiles on the part of the USSR. NATO did not want to discuss a complete elimination of these weapons systems. On the contrary, it insisted on developing a nuclear deterrent strategy and a continuation of the work on modernizing short-range missiles. In 1992, a decision will be made about their deployment depending on the results of talks with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact on disarmament. The general secretary of the alliance openly declared that the West does not want a non-nuclear Europe. The faces of many journalists reflected embarrassment by what, in fact, this great disarmament initiative is—as U.S. President Bush's plan was called by Bonn Chancellor Kohl. The journalists' questions could not be clearly answered either by the U.S. President or the Bonn chancellor.

Attention was given yet again to further questions and doubts as to whether the adopted documents can truly be termed a breakthrough.

Daily Terms Bush Proposals 'Not Entirely Clear'
LD3105150589 Prague CTK in English
0724 GMT 31 May 89

[Text] Bratislava May 31 (CTK)—The main argument following for Western propaganda from the disarmament proposals submitted by U.S. President George

Bush, is the "seizure" of political initiative by the United States, whereas the West has been on the defensive in disarmament initiatives for long", the Slovak daily PRAVDA wrote today in context with President Bush's new disarmament proposals.

PRAVDA stated that George Bush has used a special manouevre in his initiative, reducing the number of troops in Europe only to those of the United States and the Soviet Union. The aim to reduce this proposal only to the two powers is an intention following unilateral advantages, the daily said. The same limits for U.S. and Soviet troops in Europe would mean the weakening of the Warsaw Treaty, the core of which is formed by Soviet troops. In the other three points of the proposal, George Bush's formulations are not entirely clear and the U.S. side will have to specify the details yet, the Slovak daily said.

"Although George Bush has completely avoided nuclear missiles and exerted initiative only in the sphere of conventional weapons, his effort to improve the face of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the eyes of the Western public cannot be denied. Regrettably, the practical impact of Bush's proposals cannot be immediately considered. In any case, it is good that the U.S. President has submitted his proposals which can put into motion NATO delegations at the Vienna talks on conventional forces, PRAVDA concluded.

NATO Summit Results Reviewed

RUDE PRAVO Criticizes Results

LD3105150289 Prague CTK in English
0728 GMT 31 May 89

[Text] Prague May 31 (CTK)—"Who thinks about the results in Brussels, mainly now when the world and especially Europe are receding from the cold war, cannot but regret that NATO remains quite inaccessible to the idea of Europe without nuclear weapons", RUDE PRAVO said today, commenting on the recent NATO summit in Brussels.

"Mainly those who were the first to transport them to our continent and those who were the first to receive them (the United States to Britain in 1948) are firmly convinced that it is not possible to exist without them", the daily said.

It pointed out that the whole conception of control of armament and disarmament—one of the two main documents adopted in the Brussels meeting—reckons with a 'nuclear element' as necessary part of the NATO military doctrine. If talks on short-range nuclear missiles take place in the future, on the part of the West, they will concern exclusively their reduction not complete removal.

"The NATO political targets announced in the declaration also deserve attention, but rather criticism". In the future, NATO wants to 'overcome the division of Europe' by bringing its Eastern part closer to 'Western values'. This is an old policy, this time disguised by "the interest in restructuring in the socialist countries".

"The non-respecting of the existing borders which is apparent from the paragraph dedicated to 'the renewal of the unity of the German people through self-determination', i.e. the declared intention to put an end to the existence of the German Democratic Republic, is not certainly a way which could lead to the strengthening of peace and confidence in Europe", the daily said.

The main contribution of the Brussels summit, however, is its impetus to Vienna talks on conventional disarmament. Its speeding up would only be for the benefit of Europe, it stressed in conclusion.

Commentary on Bush Proposal

AU0106131989 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
31 May 89 p 5

[Bedrich Zagar commentary: "Bush's Attempt"]

[Text] The main argument which arose for Western propaganda out of the disarmament proposals put forward by U.S. President George Bush is "the seizing" of political initiative on the U.S. side. For months the West European allies in NATO have been pressing the American president to come up with an initiative and give some kind of response to the whole series of disarmament proposals put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev. On Monday [29 May], the first day of the summit meeting of NATO member states in Brussels, George Bush presented a four-point proposal which is a "peculiar" response.

In disarmament initiatives the West has long been on the defensive. Unfortunately, it is impossible to immediately judge the practical impact of the new Bush proposals. Bush used in his initiative a special maneuver. As far as the number of troops in Europe is concerned, he has restricted himself only to the United States and the USSR and proposes for both sides a limit of around 275,000 men. Narrowing down this proposal only to both superpowers is an aim which pursues unilateral advantages. In NATO American troops do not form the center of Western military alliance forces, but it is the Federal Republic of Germany which has the strongest army. If the strength of the British, French, and Italian Armed Forces are added to this, to say nothing about the other NATO member states, it seems that equal limits on United States and Soviet troops in Europe would weaken the Warsaw Pact, whose core is forces from the Soviet Army. This is the most problematic of Bush's proposals.

In the other three points, the American President refers to NATO forces and incorporates into them artillery, armored vehicles, and aircraft on land bases (and what

about seaborne aircraft?). President Bush's formulations are not altogether precise and unequivocal. The American side will still have to detail them. Although Bush has, on the whole, avoided the issue of nuclear weapons and has developed his initiative only in the sphere of conventional weapons, it is impossible to deny his attempt to improve the appearance of NATO in the eyes of the Western public. Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, after his arrival in Paris yesterday, where he is attending a conference on the CSCE human dimension, welcomed the American disarmament proposals: "I think that these are important proposals which are a step in the right direction." Understandably, he asked for some time for a more detailed assessment and decision on what will be the final position of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact.

A remarkable reaction was published by the British daily THE GUARDIAN which stated that Bush's pressure for the fulfillment of the American proposals before the end of 1992 is not chance. At that time a single market within the framework of the EC is to be created. The political and economic integrationist tendencies of Western Europe are considered in the United States to be an economic danger in the competition for world markets. American inflexibility over the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe is also being explained in this connection. Washington is refusing to negotiate on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons and will absolutely not concede to the idea of achieving the "third zero," that means the complete removal of these weapons. In Washington fears predominate that, by weakening its nuclear position in Europe, the political position and influence of the United States in Western Europe will also be weakened.

In any case, it is good that the American President has come up with his own proposals which can set in motion the NATO delegations at the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces. The present differences of opinion at the Vienna negotiations are too great to possibly expect specific results within 6 months. For example, preliminary talks have so far not even been implemented on air forces. If, despite this, the negotiations in Vienna move forward, the Bush initiative will have been praiseworthy.

Commentary Criticizes NATO Summit Meeting
*AU0106133689 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
 31 May 89 p 7*

[Milan Madr commentary: "Message From Brussels"]

[Text] The 40th anniversary of the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (official name NATO) was an opportunity for the heads of state and government of its 16 members to meet at the alliance's headquarters in Brussels. A gathering of such distinguished representatives does not take place every year. What, then, did it bring?

It is proper to place the most significant matter right at the front. This is the four-point disarmament proposal put forward by American President George Bush which was incorporated into the final documents from the summit meeting. It sets ceilings on certain types of weapons which each of the two military blocs in Europe would have after reductions. For the first time, it contains Western agreement that conventional arms control should also include ground forces' combat aircraft and helicopters and it further envisages a reduction in the number of American and Soviet troops outside their national borders to around 275,000 men on each side. It also contains an appeal for NATO and the Warsaw Pact to speed up the negotiations on conventional disarmament in Vienna so that an agreement can be reached within 6 months to a year and the agreed reduction implemented before 1992 or 1993.

The appropriate specialists and governments involved will express their opinion on this proposal in detail and in principle. However, at first glance it is obvious that this American step—at this time the joint NATO platform, though with the reservations of some representatives—appears to meet the needs of the time, the strengthening of peace and security in Europe and a reinforcement of trust.

In light of the seriousness of these proposals, it is not important what the Western press in general wrote about these days, that is, that the American President had to get out of the straight-jacket of inertia he has been in to date and respond specifically to the peace initiatives coming from Moscow. As the Belgian newspaper LE SOIR wrote on Tuesday [30 May] that it is vital that "he raised the barrier, as far as the content of the negotiations is concerned, and for the first time agreed that in the first phase the number of men, aircraft, and helicopters is negotiated—that is, the three areas that NATO has blocked...."

Bush's four points give a significant stimulus to the Vienna negotiations. However, no one has to urge the socialist countries, as happened in Brussels, to contribute to their acceleration. From them—as is well known—one has never heard smug and irresponsible pronouncements that "we will arm the other side to death" and the impetus has never come from them to introduce increasingly destructive types of weapons into their armaments. On the contrary, they always did this after the NATO states, whose military birth certificate was written at a time when Dulles' policy of "rolling back communism" by means of "brinkmanship" was in vogue in the West.

Whoever ponders the results in Brussels, especially at the present time when the world, and Europe in particular, are receding from the cold war, cannot but regret that NATO remains absolutely inaccessible to the idea of a Europe without nuclear weapons. Especially those who first transported them to our continent and those who first received them onto their territory (the United States to Britain in 1948) are firmly convinced that it is

impossible to exist without them. The whole concept of armament and disarmament control—one of the two main documents adopted at the Brussels meeting—reckons with a “nuclear element” as an essential part of NATO military doctrine. If negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles take place in the future, on the Western side these will exclusively involve a reduction in their number, not their complete removal.

The political aims of NATO announced in the declaration also deserve attention, or rather criticism. In the future, NATO wants “to overcome the division of Europe” and it wants to do this by bringing its Eastern part closer to “Western values.” It is almost pointless to ask if this is not an old policy; however, this time it is veiled in a new guise of interest in restructuring in the socialist countries. The lack of respect for existing borders, which is apparent in the paragraph devoted to “the restoration of the unity of the German people by means of free self-determination,” that is, the declared intention to do away with the existence of the GDR is also certainly not a path which could lead to the strengthening of peace and trust in Europe.

However, the main contribution of the Brussels summit is its welcome stimulus for the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament. Their speeding up would only be to the benefit of Europe's health.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

NVA, GSFG Joint Troop Exercise Observed *AU2405155689 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 20-21 May 89 p 2*

[Text] Potsdam (ADN)—On Friday [19 May], the 40 observers of the maneuvers from 20 CSCE signatory states, who have been in the GDR since Tuesday, were following the action at the Wittstock training area during the joint troop exercises of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany [GSFG] and the National People's Army [NVA]. The generals, officers, and diplomats were briefed on the situation and the course of the defense actions.

The head of the exercise, Major General Stanislav Rumyantsev, commander of a GSFG unit, told ADN that the participants in the exercise had acted with combat-readiness and military skill during the past few days.

On the same day, and after having successfully carried out their order, more units and forces were transferred to their garrisons from the exercise areas of Magdeburg, Brandenburg, Neustrelitz, and Pritzwalk. The international guests were able to directly observe overland movement and rail transportation. Thus, in the course of the day the number of army members in the exercise area fell below 17,000 men. The observer activity of the

foreign representatives thus ended in line with the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

On behalf of the GDR Government, and on the order of Defense Minister Army General Heinz Kessler, the observers were given a cordial send off this evening in Potsdam by Major General Rudolf Magnitzke, deputy chief of the NVA Main Staff. He stated that they had had many opportunities to see for themselves that the Stockholm documents had been adhered to by the GDR. From the talks, it was made clear to the observers that the army members of the forces involved wished a peaceful future and felt no hatred toward other people, he said.

Daily Calls for ‘Constructive’ NATO Response *AU2905154789 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 24 May 89 p 2*

[“W.M.” editorial: “Appeal to NATO—How Will It Decide?”]

[Text] The chance to completely overcome the consequences of the “cold war” in Europe and in the world, to eliminate military confrontation, and to create security for all has to be used. This is the concern of the appeal of the Warsaw Pact states to the NATO member states, which will meet next week for their annual summit. NATO is facing a turning point: Will it respond constructively to our proposals on disarmament and to our unilateral advance moves? Or will it miss the favorable opportunity for a fundamental change for the better in the international situation?

We think that the realities of today's world require a new concept of security—a security that is mutual and undivided; a security that is based on the steady reduction of military confrontation and armaments. All armed forces on land, in the air, and on sea, have to be included in this process, and all weapons—conventional, nuclear, and chemical ones. Thus we have made our proposal to start separate negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons; there is the consideration of also including armed forces and armaments on sea in the process of negotiations. We have made our offer to reduce armed forces on the whole to a level that is sufficient for defense, to discuss the military doctrines and their material-technical shaping, and to start a mechanism of constructive cooperation. This is how real military-political stability can be reached.

In NATO there is a quarrel about whether the Lance missiles in the FRG will be replaced with missiles that have a range four-times longer or whether negotiations will be held on steps to eliminate these weapons. It is truly of great importance that no steps are taken to make the negotiation process more complicated and to give new impetus to the arms race under the excuse of modernizing weapons. Not only tactical nuclear weapons are on the agenda but disarmament in all fields—and also questions concerning an agreement on restraint with

regards to regional conflicts, restriction of arms deals, security of the trading lanes, coordination in the struggle against international terrorism and drug trafficking.

The Warsaw Pact proposes to NATO to establish relations of political dialogue between the two alliances and contacts between their representatives. It is ready to study counterproposals for the promotion of positive trends in international relations. It is now NATO's turn.

U.S. Criticized for Violation of INF Treaty
*AU2905143389 East Berlin DER MORGEN
in German 25 May 89 p 2*

[“DM” commentary: “False Play”]

[Text] According to Western news agencies, some days ago the Foreign Policy Committee of the U.S. Senate called on President George Bush to demand from the Soviet Union a “clarification” of its attitude toward the INF Treaty. According to the same sources, at the same time U.S. Secretary of State James Baker announced that it would not be good for the coming arms control talks if the Soviet Union were to rescind the pledges accepted in the previous negotiations. In view of the Soviet side’s loyalty to the treaty in implementing the INF treaty and the new, numerous Soviet disarmament initiatives and advance moves in other areas, political observers necessarily ask themselves what the background of such a campaign is. To anticipate the matter: The answer to this question is not favorable for the United States.

As is known, within the framework of the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union agreed to abolish its only really modern short-range missile, the SS-23, even though this missile with a range of a bit below 500 km does not really fall under the conditions of the treaty. This was a unilateral act of goodwill by the Soviet Union, which was intended to make it easier to extend the process of nuclear disarmament, which had been initiated with the INF Treaty, to other fields. Therefore, it must seem all the more strange and cynical that, as a response, the United States is affirming with increasing emphasis to station a follow-up weapon to its Lance missiles, whose tactical and technical data correspond to the SS-23 missiles that are destined for abolition, in the course of the so-called modernization of its nuclear short-range missiles. With a range of almost 500 km, the envisaged follow-up system has four times the range of the old Lance missile and a considerably higher precision. It is a qualitatively completely new and highly destabilizing attack weapon.

However, as Mikhail Gorbachev stressed at his recent talks with U.S. Secretary of State Baker, the Soviet Union agreed to the abolition of the SS-23 only under the precondition that none of the sides, that is, also the United States, builds or stations such missiles in the future. In view of this, one is tempted to ask how the United States would react if it were to unilaterally abolish one of its weapons systems and the Soviet Union would react to this with the introduction of a new

adequate weapons system? It is no surprise that in view of the above-mentioned facts, the Soviet Union stated that if NATO really were to decide in favor of modernization, it would have to consider whether to stop the destruction of the SS-23 or to develop a new, comparable missiles system.

The Soviet Union does not let any doubts arise about its determination to continue the process of disarmament in all spheres. This is demonstrated by its recently stated readiness to withdraw all nuclear ammunition from the territories of the Warsaw Pact countries in 1989-91, if the United States acts accordingly and by its decision to withdraw 500 nuclear warheads of tactical nuclear weapons already this year. The process of disarmament, however, also requires adequate behavior and goodwill of the other side. And, referring to the initially quoted statements by U.S. politicians, it is, above all, unacceptable to call for certain behavior by others which one does not follow oneself. Facts show that it is not the Soviet Union that acts in violation of the treaty. On the contrary, it is doing everything in its power to prevent the other side from circumventing the stipulations of the INF Treaty. It is the U. S. turn to prove its trustworthiness.

Krolkowski on NATO Response to Pact Initiative
LD2605194389 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1348 GMT 26 May 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The GDR and its allies have, with their balanced proposals and considerable unilateral prior concessions, demonstrated their will for disarmament and thus done a great deal for result-oriented progress in negotiations, GDR First Deputy Foreign Minister Dr Herbert Krolkowski said at a meeting of the People’s Chamber Foreign Affairs Committee in Berlin today. It is now up to NATO to make the appropriate political decisions and to make progress in the disarmament negotiations possible through a suitable approach.

On the basis of the Berlin meeting of the Warsaw Pact Committee of Foreign Ministers, Krolkowski explained to the committee the latest initiatives of the socialist states in the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces and armaments in Europe.

Deputy Foreign Minister Christian Meyer told the deputies that competition in the markets has intensified further and he explained the increased demands on GDR combines and export enterprises in making available export goods of high quality and of a high scientific-technical standard.

The committee then discussed the bills on the GDR’s consular treaties with the Republic of Sudan and the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. These treaties provide the contractual basis for consular relations with these states.

Correspondent on Bush Proposals, Missile Talks
LD2905210489 East Berlin Voice of GDR Domestic Service in German 1605 GMT 29 May 89

[Text] In Brussels today the summit meeting of heads of state and governments of the 16 NATO states was held which is dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the Western alliance. Here is a report from our special correspondent Detlef (?Ohle) from the press center of NATO headquarters:

[Begin recording] Here at NATO headquarters this morning U.S. President Bush submitted a 4-point proposal intended to speed up the Vienna negotiations. This is the most important event to date on this first day of the summit. In the first of four points in his eagerly-awaited statement, Bush mentioned things that are already known, namely the common ceilings for tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery to be achieved by negotiation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in Vienna. Point two proposes reducing land-based combat aircraft and helicopters of both sides to a level that is 15 percent below current NATO levels. This is without a doubt a new point of view, because so far in Vienna NATO has refused to include these weapons in the negotiations.

Point three also signifies at least a modification of the view held up to now. It proposes the reduction of U.S. troops in Europe and Soviet troops stationed outside the USSR in Europe to equal ceilings of 275,000 each. Up to now the NATO teams wanted, at least in the first phase, to exclude this. However, this third point requires much greater reductions by the Soviet Union than by the United States.

And fourth, the U.S. President believes that one can reach the goal in Vienna much quicker than has been thought so far, namely within 6-12 months. The signing of a relevant accord could then be accomplished by 1992 or 1993. People knowledgeable in these matters (?might) doubt whether this is realistic. The Vienna negotiations so far do not suggest that it is, however, unless NATO is planning a completely different negotiating strategy. Many people see here a connection with the recently hotly-disputed problem of short-range missiles. Bush indicated that he could imagine a start to negotiations on these weapons before a Vienna agreement had been concluded, given prospects of success. To achieve [words indistinct] within 6-12 months [words indistinct] hardly meet with any resistance within NATO. The question is actually how realistic for Vienna is this short period of time mentioned by Bush. If it is drawn out longer, over several years, the United States could, with the formula used by Bush in practice, delay negotiations on the short-range missiles as it wishes. We shall see.

This afternoon, however, a high-ranking working group was set up which is to sound out whether a formula can be found for short-range weapons that is a viable compromise. So far nothing official has yet reached the outside about a result. On the sidelines one could hear

that the U.S. President had found approval for his formula. Hopefully we will learn today whether this is correct. And on this depend further assessments of the 4-point proposal which Bush has submitted. Cautious, initial evaluations see two standpoints: the first is that in some areas of the Vienna negotiations there are indications of changed evaluations by Washington which could possibly have positive effects; the other is that it is quite clearly a reaction by Bush to international pressure.

From among their own ranks there have been repeated demands, right up to the run-up to this summit, that NATO should at last take concrete initiatives. From the point of view of the majority of the West European alliance partners it would have been sufficient initially to respond to the Eastern negotiating offer on the reduction or elimination of short-range nuclear missiles without any ifs or buts. But as the position of the U.S. administration is quite a different one President Bush has also made a different attempt to come out of the defensive.
[end recording]

Modernization of Short-Range Missiles Viewed
AU3005135489 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 29 May 89 p 2

[Editorial by "W.M.": "Missiles To Be Shelved?"]

[Text] On the eve of the NATO summit, the quarrel over the short-range nuclear missiles on FRG territory has not been settled. Contrary to what was repeatedly announced, no compromise has apparently been reached by the exchange of letters or at meetings which represented tests of strength between the alliance partners over the missile issue.

At a closer look, the compromise readiness announced by Washington proved to be a mockery: The United States, which flatly rejected any talks with the Warsaw Pact on tactical nuclear weapons, now is reportedly ready to hold negotiations; however, not only after conventional disarmament has been agreed upon in Vienna, but after it has been implemented. Even optimists believe that this can only be done in a few years at best, and therefore, the difference between rejecting and shelving negotiations is negligible. This all the more so, since Washington keeps to NATO's so-called modernization decision. In other words, it will begin producing new systems with a range of 480 kilometers, to replace the 120-km range Lance missiles deployed in the FRG following elections in that country.

The new Washington administration apparently intends to confront its alliance partners with accomplished facts. It uses the problem of short-range missiles to demonstratively confirm its policy of strength also toward its alliance partners. There is no other explanation for the reason it makes the existence of such weapons on FRG territory appear as a matter of survival for NATO—as if the West was defenseless without these systems.

However, after the intermediate-range missiles have been removed, the further existence of tactical nuclear weapons represents a very specific serious threat for the Europeans. Washington's fanatic insistence on these weapons proves its readiness to use them, if necessary. This became alarmingly clear in a WASHINGTON POST report on strategic war games at the Newport Naval War College, in which the FRG was changed into a "nuclear desert". Thus tactical nuclear weapons on the dividing line between the military blocs are an explosive problem for the governments of the FRG and neighboring NATO countries. It is an existential issue and, in view of the fact that four out of five federal citizens reject such missiles, above all a political one.

Therefore, the FRG has advocated talks with the Warsaw Pact on these weapons. Meanwhile, however, some politicians in the government coalition apparently are ready to sacrifice the federal citizens' vital interests to agreement with the opponents of disarmament in the Atlantic Alliance. We will have to carefully watch the formulations of the NATO summit, which is scheduled to begin this Monday [29 May], and of course also the deeds following it.

Response to Bush Proposals at NATO Summit

Meyer: 'Every Step' Welcomed
LD3005222789 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1522 GMT 30 May 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—In response to questions from correspondents, Ambassador Wolfgang Meyer, spokesman for the GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said in Berlin today that the proposal put forward by U.S. President George Bush at the NATO summit in Brussels on the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe is being examined in detail by the GDR. It is in any case an initiative in the right direction. The GDR welcomes every step that can advance mankind along the path of arms limitation and disarmament.

In conclusion, the spokesman underlined that the rapid reduction of conventional weapons, for which the GDR is working unreservedly, makes an immediate start to negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons all the more necessary.

Bush Speech: 'Old Cliches'
LD3105203289 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1625 GMT 31 May 89

[“Bush in Mainz: Old Cliches and Impudent Claims, by ADN correspondent Horst Schaefer”—ADN headline]

[Text] Mainz (ADN)—Today, within the framework of his visit to the Federal Republic, U.S. President George Bush made a speech at an event in the Rheingold-Halle in Mainz which was described as a "speech on important principles" of East-West relations. What the guest then heard, however, were old cliches and impudent claims.

To begin with Bush admitted that Europe was the most heavily armed continent in the world and spoke about the need for sound, verifiable accords on arms control between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. When he outlined the tasks and demands on NATO for the future however, he invoked as the basis the old strategy of deterrence and strength.

In several parts of his speech Bush then called into question the foundations of the European postwar order in that he in fact called for the abolition of the existing borders on the continent. In so doing he was interfering in internal affairs of socialist states and passing judgement on their sovereign behavior. The CSCE process must be used to force through Western values in Eastern Europe. The "Voice of America" and "Deutsche Welle" radio station have an outstanding part to play in guiding this policy, he said. Bush also urged the "great political parties in the West" to assume "historic responsibility" for this.

Bush renewed the unsuitable attempt of his predecessor in office, failing to appreciate the historical and political realities, to lay down in particular rules for the border between the GDR and West Berlin.

During Bush's speech demonstrators protested outside the Rheingold-Halle and in the nearby Theater Square against U.S. policy in Latin America. They unfolded a banner with the appeal "Against the terror of U.S. imperialism in Nicaragua and elsewhere," which was confiscated by security forces.

In his speech prior to the U.S. President Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl said that membership in NATO is the "unshakeable foundation" of his foreign and security policy. There is no doubt about the FRG's bonds with the West. Its future does not lie somewhere in no man's land between West and East. The FRG is not a wanderer between the worlds.

NATO Agrees to Short-Range Missile Compromise
LD3005124689 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0959 GMT 30 May 89

[Text] Brussels (ADN)—The NATO member states have agreed to a compromise on the problem of short-range nuclear missiles at their summit in Brussels. The heads of state and government of the 16 member states voted in favor of a relevant proposal from the foreign ministers at the end of the summit on Tuesday morning.

It was learned from NATO sources that the agreement envisages that negotiations on short-range missiles could begin if an agreement is reached on conventional forces in Europe at the Vienna negotiations and if that agreement were to begin to be implemented. But in that case there should only be discussion of a reduction, not, however, of a further zero solution, on the complete removal of short-range nuclear missiles.

EAST EUROPE

GDR Delegate on 'Further' Pact Arms Proposal

LD3005181289 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1527 GMT 30 May 89

[Excerpt] Vienna (ADN)—At the Vienna negotiations on conventional arms in Europe today the GDR submitted on behalf of the Warsaw Pact a further proposal concerning ceilings for offensive forces in central Europe.

The head of the GDR delegation, Ambassador Klaus-Dieter Ernst, explained the proposal, according to which in the GDR, the CSSR, Poland, and Hungary on the Warsaw Pact side, and in the FRG, the Benelux countries, and Denmark on the NATO side no more than 570,000 soldiers, 420 tactical strike aircraft, 800 combat helicopters, 8,700 tanks, 7,600 artillery pieces, and 14,500 armored combat vehicles should remain on each side.

Since the start of the second round of negotiations between the 23 countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the beginning of May, the socialist countries have introduced a whole range of initiatives. The Warsaw Pact has thus, Ambassador Klaus-Dieter Ernst said in an ADN interview, presented very detailed proposals for a future agreement on reductions.

Clear aims regarding content and time have been set to fulfill the mandate of these negotiations, namely to consolidate stability and security in Europe and in so doing "eliminate as a matter of priority the capability to launch surprise attacks and to start large-scale offensive actions."

The head of the GDR delegation said that the overall concept of the Warsaw Pact emanates from the view that, in an agreement on reductions for the entire theater from the Atlantic to the Urals, equal upper limits for both alliances must be set for those categories of arms that are particularly important for offensive operations and surprise attacks.

The proposed ceilings for each side are: 1.35 million soldiers, 1,500 tactical strike aircraft, 1,700 combat helicopters, 20,000 tanks, 24,000 artillery pieces, and 28,000 armored combat vehicles.

Ambassador Ernst stressed that in order to achieve these ceilings drastic reductions in Europe of some 2 million soldiers; tens of thousands of tanks, combat vehicles, and artillery pieces; and thousands of strike aircraft and combat helicopters are necessary.

Moreover, to make threatening concentrations of the remaining forces impossible and—as the mandate also demands—to remove imbalances within areas it is necessary to divide Europe into different geographical zones with specified ceilings for offensive forces which must not be exceeded, Ambassador Ernst said.

In this connection the regulations for central Europe are naturally particularly significant. "For this reason, our delegation has also presented the already-named figures for this region. If they are agreed upon then the concentration of military forces in this area and thus the danger of surprise attacks throughout Europe will be considerably reduced."

The head of the GDR delegation pointed out that in view of the large number of offensive weapons which the United States, for example, has stockpiled in the FRG and which could very quickly be brought into action, it is particularly important in all settlements that in addition to the active units the reserve stocks of the armed forces also be included.

Further Warsaw Pact proposals envisage that no state possess more than 35 to 40 percent of the remaining total forces in Europe and that ceilings be set for those armed forces and arms that can be deployed abroad on the continent. The proposed relevant limits for each alliance are 350,000 soldiers, 350 strike aircraft, 600 combat helicopters, 4,500 tanks, 4,000 artillery pieces, and 7,500 armored combat vehicles. Ambassador Ernst recalled that in the Warsaw Pact only the USSR has troops stationed abroad, while in NATO this applies to the United States, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Canada. [passage omitted]

Pact Air Force Commanders Consult in Berlin

LD0106111489 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0944 GMT 1 Jun 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The latest Warsaw Pact disarmament proposals are a further step toward preventing an arms race. This was underlined today by Army General Heinz Kessler, GDR minister of defense, during a friendly exchange of views with Colonel General of Aviation Vadim Andreyev, deputy commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Air Forces. The meeting at the Defense Ministry was attended by the chiefs of the air forces and air defense forces of the fraternal armies, who are in the GDR for several days of consultations.

Army Gen Kessler underlined the responsibility of the allied armed forces to reliably safeguard peace and socialism. He described the GDR's unilateral measures to reduce armed forces and armaments, including the disbanding of a fighter aircraft squadron and the decommissioning of 50 aircraft, as a contribution to implementing their joint peace strategy.

HUNGARY

Nemeth Meets Netherlands Defense Minister

LD2605091389 Budapest MTI in English 2118 GMT 25 May 89

[Text] Budapest, May 25 (MTI)—Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth met Frits Bolkestein, defence minister of the Netherlands, on Thursday.

They reviewed a few issues related to the consideration of peace and security in Europe and discussed possibilities for the development of cooperation between the two countries.

Horn, Military Chief Address FRG Journalists
*LD2605214489 Budapest MTI in English
1819 GMT 26 May 89*

[Text] Budapest, May 26 (MTI)—The central issue of world politics today is disarmament, a field where progress is crucial for Hungary to attain notable results in the political and economic areas, Foreign Minister Gyula Horn stated at the 2nd congress of Hungarian and FRG journalists in Tata, on Friday.

The first congress was held in October last year in Gerlingen, the twin-city of Tata, under a cooperation agreement between the National Association of Hungarian Journalists and the Baden-Wurttemberg branch of the FRG journalist organization. Discussions covered topical economic and cultural issues.

During the Friday conference, the FRG delegation was informed of current social changes in Hungary and the position of disarmament and environmental protection. Participants included representatives of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Water Management, the alternative environmental movements and the local parliament of Baden-Wuerttemberg.

Mr Horn stated that despite certain technical problems and differences in views, the chance exists for successful conclusion of the Vienna disarmament talks within a reasonable period of time. The relevant conditions have improved after the Warsaw Treaty and NATO members adopted a more realistic and compromising approach to international political issues.

The socialist countries have admitted that the view that the victory of world socialism would automatically solve the problems of armament and disarmament has become outdated. They have also realized the importance of subordinating military factors to political work. In response to the initiatives of the socialist states, NATO has taken confidence-building measures.

Hungary calls for setting up further zones free of weapons and nuclear arms from the Urals to the Atlantic, Mr Horn said.

Lieutenant General Tibor Toth, deputy chief of staff of the Hungarian People's Army, pointed out that a unilateral reduction of the Hungarian Army strength is viable on the principle of sufficient defence. By the end of next year, 250 Hungarian tanks and 430 artillery guns will have been removed and destroyed. With the inclusion of the Soviet troop withdrawals and the Hungarian Army cuts, there will be 20,000 fewer soldiers in the country in late 1990, a drop of 12 percent.

Netherlands Defense Minister Departs 26 May
*LD2605140789 Budapest MTI in English
1100 GMT 26 May 89*

[Text] Budapest, May 26 (MTI)—Frits Bolkestein, minister of defence of the Kingdom of The Netherlands, in Hungary on a four-day official visit as the head of a military delegation at the invitation of Colonel General Ferenc Karpati, minister of defence, left Budapest on Friday.

Mr Bolkestein held talks at the ministry of defence. The parties surveyed achievements in military confidence-and security-building in Europe, the two countries' endeavours to advance detente, and the fields where the establishment of relations between the two armies belonging to various military blocs might promote the process of detente in Europe.

The Dutch delegation visited Kossuth Lajos Military College where Mr Bolkestein delivered a paper on the military and security policy endeavours of his country.

Near Szentendre, a town about 25 kms from Budapest, they visited an anti-aircraft missile unit which serves the defence of Budapest. The guests also saw some of Hungary's historical and cultural sights.

Mr Bolkestein met Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth.

At Budapest's Ferihegy Airport, the Dutch minister and his party were seen off with military honours by Ferenc Karpati and several high-ranking representatives of the ministry of defence.

Soviet Motorized Infantry Unit Withdrawn
28 May
*LD2805182889 Budapest MTI in English
1734 GMT 28 May 89*

[Text] Budapest, May 28 (MTI)—On Sunday, the Soviet motorized infantry regiment of Taborfalva (near Budapest) left its garrison as the last phase of the withdrawal of the 13th Armoured Guards Division of the Soviet Southern Army Group temporarily stationed in Hungary. This was the last stage of the unilateral reduction of Soviet land forces announced for this year. So far 90 per cent of the planned quota has left Hungary. The festive rally of the regiment was attended by Brigadier General Lajos Krasznai, chief of the Political Division of the Hungarian People's Army and deputy minister, Colonel Matvey Burlakov, commander of the Southern Army Group, Gyula Biro, general secretary of the Hungarian-Soviet Friendship Society, and members of the military attache corps accredited to Hungary.

After the rally, the 15 tanks, 30 armoured vehicles and 600 soldiers set out in the presence of the participants.

The motorized infantry division will be dissolved and its flag transferred to the Soviet war history museum. One part of the staff will be demobilized, and the other part given other posts in the Soviet Union. The military technology will be either destroyed or converted for non-military use.

Correspondent on Bush Arms Proposal in Brussels
*LD2905174189 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1630 GMT 29 May 89*

[Text] Our next dispatch comes from Brussels where President Bush gave a speech today at the anniversary session of NATO. Our special correspondent is Zsolt Szalay.

[Begin recording] [Szalay] The U.S. President was not dissatisfied with himself; he described his own disarmament proposals as simply revolutionary which must change the military map of Europe. What is at issue is the reduction of conventional armies—ones without nuclear weapons. In the four points of the Bush proposal the real novelty is that the United States is ready to involve military planes and helicopters, something which until now it had not been ready to do. The present quantity would need to be reduced by 15 percent. In addition, the United States would take home or disarm some 70,000 soldiers provided that the Soviet Union do the same some five times over: for, according to U.S. calculations, in this way the upper limits would be identical. He is proposing a reduction in tanks, personnel carriers, and artillery pieces which is similarly unequal—larger for the Warsaw Pact—to achieve the same upper limit. Finally, he recommends the speeding up of the Vienna arms limitation negotiations. In his view it could be possible to reach an agreement within 6 months, but within a year at the outside, and the disarmament process too could be completed faster than proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev—instead of 1997, in 1993.

Thus, at first sight the Bush script does not appear of a particularly pioneering character but in the unanimous view of the several thousands journalists gathered in Brussels he wanted to prove first of all to the NATO member states themselves that it was not Gorbachev only who was the star on the disarmament stage.

Second, it would not have done for the 40-year-old NATO not to mark the anniversary with a big bang [nagy dobas].

Third, it is suitable to divert attention from the so-called missile debate which, here at the summit too, divides the United States and the FRG. In this affair, a newly established expert committee is attempting to seek out a mutually acceptable solution—without much chance.

Bush Arms Proposal Termed 'Most Significant'
*LD3005195689 Budapest Television Service
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 30 May 89*

[Excerpts] [Studio announcer] NATO is prepared, after all, to negotiate with the Soviet Union about short-range missiles, but it stipulates that even before that an agreement should be concluded about conventional arms' reduction at the Vienna talks. Denes Baracs reports from Brussels about the NATO summit:

[Baracs] According to U.S. President Bush's proposal, the East-West disarmament agreement regarding conventional weapons should be worked out in Vienna within 6 months to a year. So, negotiations with the Soviet Union about tactical nuclear missiles could even start before 1992; in other words, even before modernization perhaps, about which a decision will be made only in 1992, according to the allies' agreement. Western leaders described all of this as a help to perestroyka because disarmament will free large sums for the Soviet economy.

In the closing statement, the 16 leaders dealt in detail with the East European countries and urged them to continue reforms or, where these do not exist, to introduce them. [passage omitted]

[Studio announcer] According to Hungarian assessment, George Bush's Brussels proposal is the most significant Western disarmament initiative since the U.S.-USSR missile agreement. This was stated by Ambassador David Meiszner in Vienna at the negotiations on conventional forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

POLAND

NATO Brussels Meeting Outcomes Viewed
*LD3105040189 Warsaw PAP in English
0021 GMT 31 May 89*

[By PAP's special correspondent Włodzimierz Korzycki]

[Text] Brussels, May 30—While commenting on the outcomes of the Brussels meeting straight away, one can say that having broken its internal resistance, NATO brought itself to embark on the detente course more badly.

The fact is that the West, already earlier, had presented various disarmament proposals but the impetus of Mikhail Gorbachev's actions surprised, almost petrified strategists from NATO who needed two years to work out a new political concept. President Bush in an impressive way took over the initiative within the alliance and through his far-reaching initiative proved the will to act together with the Soviet leader for the benefit of the global peace.

During his press conference, the President mentioned his announced visit to Poland and to Hungary. He said that he would try to explain to his interlocutors the stance of Washington on the reformatory processes in the two countries.

Defense Minister on Restructuring Armed Forces
*LD0206030989 Warsaw PAP in English
2207 GMT 1 Jun 89*

[Text] Warsaw, June 1—PUWP CC [Polish United Workers Party Central Committee] Political Bureau Member and Minister of National Defence General Florian Siwicki answered today telephone questions by readers and electors at the editorial office of ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI daily here.

General Siwicki said: "We started work on the restructuring of armed forces two years ago when a favourable political and military situation clearly emerged in Europe, and we acknowledged that a danger of a possible conflict was moving away. At the same time we noticed a need and a possibility to relieve our national economy from servicing the armed forces. We came to a conclusion that much could be changed without losing anything of the army combat capability."

"One could not unequivocally define now what model of armed forces would be binding in future. Much will depend on decisions which will be taken in Vienna where talks on reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe are now under way. It can be stated generally that it will be a smaller army, a more modern one, and in a farther perspective probably one depending to a greater extent on career soldiers," said Siwicki.

ROMANIA

SCINTEIA on Halting Missile Modernization
*AU2405111889 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
 1024 GMT 24 May 89*

[“Excerpts of Commentary in the Daily SCINTEIA of 24 May: ‘For the Halting of Nuclear Arms Modernization Actions’”]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES 24/5/1989—President Nicolae Ceausescu pointed out in his speeches lately and in declarations made at the recent meeting of the Executive Political Committee of the CC [Central Committee] of the RCP [Romanian Communist Party], the dangers entailed by the actions of reactivation of the nuclear arms race, especially by the NATO plans for the so-called modernization of the short-range tactical nuclear missiles. The Romanian president cautioned more than once about the euphoria induced by certain steps taken toward disarmament. Or, the fact is that, after the removal of the medium-range missiles under the accord signed in this connection, the world arsenals of nuclear missiles still retain tremendous amounts of weapons—over 95 percent—which keep practically unchanged what the experts term “the overkilling capacity,” meaning the capacity to destroy the whole of mankind several times over, to destroy the very conditions of life on our planet. Under the circumstances, the peoples were entitled to hope for and expect progress toward the diminution of the arsenals in existence.

Unfortunately, as President Nicolae Ceausescu showed at the big civic rally in Drobeta-Turnu Severin, “it seems that some have got frightened by the prospect of disarmament, of loss of profits from the policy of arming, but also of possibilities to promote the policy of nuclear blackmail, the policy of strength and dictate and they have actually started to draw back.”

There is no other way for mankind's survival than the complete liquidation of the nuclear combat means, of the chemical weapons, of other mass destruction weapons, the radical reduction of the conventional weapons, the renunciation of the policy of outer space militarization. Disarmament is today a vital requisite of the whole of mankind's future and life. In consideration of this requirement, Romania's president expressed the whole Romanian people's thoughts and aspirations, urged all peoples in Europe, all political forces, governments, heads of state to say a resolute no to nuclear and chemical weapons, to work for ensuring the peaceful future of mankind.

Expressing their unanimous adhesion to this enthusing appeal, a large number of mass and public organizations, representing the broadest categories of working people in Romania, address in turn these days to governments and similar organizations in the NATO member countries appeals voicing their worry about the plans of modernization of the tactical nuclear weapons and demand that everything possible be done for those plans and any measure meant to stimulate the arming spiral to be given up. The appeals stress on good reason that the modernization of those missiles would annual the results scored so far on the road to nuclear disarmament, replacing one destructive power by another, more sophisticated and dangerous one, would entail unforeseeable consequences on a European and world plane.

The tendency of some of the Atlantic circles to stick at any cost to “nuclear deterrence” or to the outlook of “flexible retaliation” which means the use of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, is in utter contradiction with the fundamental interests of peace, with the requirements of the peoples, of public opinion for the definitive renunciation of the nuclear missiles, irrespective of their range.

That is why, on reiterating at the Executive Political Committee meeting Romania's firm stand against the modernization of the short-range nuclear missiles, President Nicolae Ceausescu stressed the need for the NATO to give up any decision and measure toward the modernization of these weapons. Romania thinks that resolute action must be taken for the beginning of negotiations on eliminating them for good.

Firmly sustaining this desideratum, the necessity of complete removal of all nuclear weapons by 2000, Romania's mass and public organizations reiterate a fundamental option of the Romanian people. The appeals of these days, that add to the great and widely reverberated actions of past years, are one more proof of the steadiness in which Romania's citizens mean to work in support of the great imperative of disarmament and peace.

Fitting in this line is also the appeal of the Warsaw Treaty participant states to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization states, conveyed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania to the latter's diplomatic representatives. On the

eve of its summit session, the NATO is urged to intensify the efforts, the political dialogue for the halting of the arms race and the achievement of disarmament, nuclear above all, for the elimination of all mass destruction weapons and the substantive reduction of the armed forces and conventional weapons, as well as of the military expenditures, for overcoming Europe's division, through the concomitant abolition of the two political-military alliances, for the consolidation of confidence and the deepening of the collaboration among states.

It is more necessary than ever now that abstention and lucid-mindedness be shown, that nothing be spared in order to have reason, sound judgement prevail in view of achieving wide-embracing accords and understanding, up to the peoples' expectations.

SCINTEIA Views Geneva Disarmament Talks
AU2705134889 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1113 GMT 27 May 89

[“The Reduction of Military Budgets—An Essential Demand for a Passage to Disarmament”—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] A commentary in 27 May “SCINTEIA” on the spring session of the Geneva Disarmament Conference underscores that the halting of the arms race and the achievement of disarmament has been an object of debates in a bi- and multilateral framework for several years. In the almost three decades that passed since the setting up of this organism, only a few accords of secondary importance were negotiated, the newspaper notes mentioning that in fact such accords aim at controlling armaments and not disarmament proper. Chief problems like those related to an end to the nuclear arms race and the prevention of a nuclear war or the granting of security guarantees to the non-nuclear states have not been discussed yet.

Equally inefficient were also the Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MBFR) that began in 1973 and ended early this year with no results. Just the same is the situation regarding the debates in the UN Disarmament Commission which could not concretize in disarmament accords or at least in actions apt to stimulate the cessation of the arms race.

“SCINTEIA” calls attention to the fact that, while disarmament negotiations deadlocked, the states’ arsenals and, especially the nuclear powers’ have steadily grown. It is true that certain positive steps have been made of late owing to the conclusion of the treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles and to the beginning of Vienna talks, as part of CSCE, on conventional arms reduction in Europe. Notwithstanding, one cannot disregard the fact that the nuclear countries, the U.S.A. and the USSR in particular, continue to hold huge stock-piles of nuclear weapons of various types and that nuclear tests and researches for space militarization

keep on, that the NATO circles talk about a passage to modernization of a wide range of short-range missiles. Practically speaking, over 95 per cent of the nuclear arsenal remain untouched, being able to destroy mankind for several times over. And, had the short-range nuclear weapons been modernized, not only the effects of cutting intermediate-range missiles would have been annulled but an additional nuclear force would have been created, bigger than the removed one.

It is the very reason for which Romania, its president have continually militated for the achievement of disarmament, the fundamental problem of our days, a vital demand for mankind’s life and future. As President Nicolae Ceausescu underlined at the civic rally in the city of Drobeta-Turnu Severin “there is no other way for mankind’s survival but the complete elimination of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction and the radical reduction of conventional weapons.” In this spirit, the appeals of a large number of mass and public organizations in Romania addressed to the governments and similar organizations in NATO countries voice the Romanian public opinion’s preoccupation that everything possible should be done for renunciation of the projects to modernize short-range nuclear missiles that are apt to stimulate the arms race.

Owing to a complex and comprehensive agenda, the participating states agreed to concentrate on those aspect in relation to which there is a possibility for finalization. Certainly, the question referring to a military spending cut tabled by Romania as early as 1979 holds pride of place. Giving a specific example in this respect, Romania was the first country within the two alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, to have passed on to a unilateral cut in arms, troops and military spending three years ago. Now, other socialist countries have passed to such measures, which proves once more how just and necessary Romania’s action has been.

In Romania’s opinion, the reduction of military expenditure is an essential step toward halting the arms race and achieving disarmament. The whole evolution of the arms race is telling for an incontestable reality: the support for all arming and overarming efforts is represented by money allowances. The level of military budgets directly shows in the level of the arms race. The arms race has brought an insufferable financial burden on to the peoples’ shoulders, the war danger growing accordingly.

Taking into account the direct link between the spending on arming and the proliferation of arsenals, any step toward disarmament is inconceivable without a cut in military funds. The reduction of these funds automatically means to stop, even partially, the flow of financial means for arming, and the reduction of these funds automatically means to stop, even partially, the flow of financial means for arming, and the reduction of these means is naturally conducive to cutting arming. It is but natural that only in this way can the vicious circle military spending-armament-military spending, even bigger

on new weapons with a bigger power of destruction, be broken. Everything in search for an illusory balance upwards, ever higher, of arms and armaments.

The freezing and reduction of military budgets is therefore the starting point in disarmament, no kind of measures of cutting armaments and troops being conceivable without a cut in the spending on arming. One may say that the reduction of military spending is in fact the very key of coming out of the labyrinth of declarations of intent, of conditionings of all kinds, of justification for new arming measures, offering a clear perspective to the disarmament process.

According to Romania, the cutting down of military expenditures, accounting by itself for a confidence-building measure, is of a nature to help lessening the international tension, developing the collaboration and cooperation among all states on multiple planes. Experience demonstrates that the most fertile periods in point of international collaboration prove to be those when the military budgets had a relative tendency to stand still, and those of mistrust and tension coincided with a mounting in the respective budgets.

That is why, Romania, that has campaigned so perseveringly for the reduction of the military expenditures, has advocated and worked for the finalization within the UN Disarmament Commission of the process of articulation of the principles guiding the states' future actions in this domain. Romania believes that the completion of the elaboration of those principles would be of a nature to help creating a climate of confidence congenial for the achievement of international accords on freezing and reducing the military budgets, as an indispensable preparatory stage for the triggering off of a real and actual process of disarmament in harmony with all peoples' fundamental interests of peace and security, SCINTEIA concludes.

NATO Summit, 'Denuclearization' Viewed
*AU3105112889 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1106 GMT 31 May 89*

[“For Europe's Denuclearization”—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES 31/5/1989—Referring to the recent NATO summit, daily ROMANIA LIBERA writes in a commentary published in its May 31 issue: Truthful to its policy of peace, of actual promotion of disarmament, nuclear above all, Romania speaks up firmly against the NATO plans of modernization of the tactical nuclear missiles that would annul the results scored so far on the road to nuclear disarmament, replacing a force of destruction by another, more sophisticated and more dangerous one, the gist of this “modernization” meaning in fact the reactivation of the arms race, the raising of its technical and technological parametres.

The signing after long negotiations by the USSR and the U.S. of the Treaty on the Elimination of the Medium-and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) generated hopes that

it would be an impetus in the elimination of all nuclear weapons from Europe and from all over the world. The nuclear situation in Europe shows a gravity that urgently calls for more intense efforts toward the denuclearization of the continent. The precedent set by the INF Treaty demonstrates that the nuclear weapons, even of the most modern ones, can be successfully scrapped, in keeping with the aspirations of mankind. Developments, certain stands though do not point to positive tendencies. [sentence as received] It is just the opposite.

The tendencies to revert the course of progress are centered on two intimately correlated stands: The refusal to negotiate the elimination of the tactical nuclear weapons, in view of carrying through the so-called third zero option, the modernization of the tactical nuclear weapons of the NATO, so as to attain a by far bigger nuclear capacity. The pole of opposition to the third zero option is in the United States, unreservedly supported by Great Britain, notes ROMANIA LIBERA.

The above daily opines that the prospect opened by the declarations of certain American officials meaning that in certain conditions the U.S. would be the first to use the nuclear weapons, cannot be “tempting” to any European, and the least so to the West-Germans on whose territory are deployed the NATO tactical weapons. Aware of this, the NATO officials have made great efforts to dissimulate the plans generated by the flexible response.

The controversies in connection with the denuclearization of Europe, with the modernization of the tactical nuclear weapons most clearly emphasized a truth vigorously pinpointed by President Nicolae Ceausescu: “As long as the nuclear weapons are maintained the nuclear war danger maintains that will lead to the destruction of mankind, to the vanishing of life itself on our planet.” [sentence as received] Therefore peoples must firmly commit themselves to the struggle for the elimination of all nuclear weapons, for imposing a new political thinking in international life, conducive to the renunciation of the stands of force. In this context, the necessity is obvious to give up the obsolete, aggressive conception of ensuring peace by nuclear deterrence, to achieve Europe's denuclearization, an essential and compulsory condition for the building of real security for all states in the continent, ROMANIA LIBERA concludes.

YUGOSLAVIA

SFRY Supports Warsaw Pact Military Initiative
*LD2605100989 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1620 GMT 25 May 89*

[Text] Belgrade, May 25 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government today upheld the initiative of the Warsaw Pact to abolish military blocs.

Government Spokesman Ivo Vajgl said at a news conference in Belgrade today that "Yugoslavia has always supported all actions contributing to the lessening of tensions, the strengthening of peace and cooperation in the world and, especially, those leading to the reduction of military potentials."

He said the recent proposal on the abolition of military blocs was one such action.

"We look upon this initiative as part of a continuous spreading of trust and cooperation and the strengthening of the security of all countries", the Yugoslav Government spokesman said.

INDIA

Prime Minister Gandhi Comments on Agni Missile Test Program

*BK1605034489 Delhi Domestic Service in English
0240 GMT 16 May 89*

[Text] The prime minister has called for greater participation of women in every sector of the economy. Mr Rajiv Gandhi said women are to be taken along with men in the effort to strengthen the country. Addressing the concluding session of the national convention of Mahila [women] Congress-I in Bhubaneswar, Mr Gandhi said that 30-percent reservation for women in democratic bodies will bring a radical change in our body politic.

Speaking to newsmen after addressing the concluding session, Mr Rajiv Gandhi said the Agni missile testing is a part of our research program, and our own defense projects have nothing to do with any other country. He said Baliapal in Orissa's Balasore District has been chosen for setting up a national test range, as it is the only suitable point available in the country.

Defense Minister Says 'Agni' Can Carry Warheads

*BK2605031589 Delhi Domestic Service in English
0240 GMT 26 May 89*

[Text] The defense minister, Mr K.C. Pant, says the long range missile 'Agni' has the potential to carry lethal warheads and deliver them with a high degree of accuracy. He, however, pointed out that India still has some way to go before missiles enter operational service and are integrated with the armed forces.

Addressing the economic editors conference in New Delhi yesterday, Mr Pant said the integrated missile development program aims at building up our missile-based defenses. This is an option, which the country will have to consider in the coming years, he said. The defense minister said the government's policy is to compete in the international market and sell equipment and systems as also enter into agreement with other countries for joint production.

The industry minister, Mr Vengal Rao, who also addressed the conference, said the center's policy is to modernize and upgrade the technology in industry to enable it compete in foreign markets.

India's Missile Program

Advanced Surface-to-Surface Missile Tests Planned

*BK2605162589 Hong Kong AFP in English
1550 GMT 26 May 89*

[Text] New Delhi, May 26 (AFP)—India plans to test an advanced surface-to-surface missile at the end of the year after joining an exclusive club of nations with the successful launch of a ballistic missile, defence scientists said Friday [26 May].

The planned testing of Akash (sky) in December is part of a tight schedule set for India's indigenous missile development programme, the scientists told a news conference here.

Akash, a medium-range missile, would have a multi-target capability. Its testing will be followed by the deployment in 1991 of Prithvi (earth), a short-range tactical battlefield missile, and Trishul (trident), a surface-to-air missile, the scientists said.

Prithvi was successfully tested in 1988 and Trishul in 1987. A third-generation anti-tank missile named Nag (cobra) is undergoing flight trials.

Both Akash and Nag are expected to be operational by 1993, said the scientists, including V.S. Arunachalam, Abdul Kalam and R.N. Agarwal, who are all closely involved in the billion-dollar missile development program launched in 1983.

The news conference came a day after Defence Minister Krishna Chandra Pant said India was likely to opt soon for a missile-based defence system. India has reportedly decided to also begin work on producing an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Defence researchers here are basking in the aftermath of Monday's successful test of Agni (fire), India's first intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), which put the country in an exclusive club of nations with their own ballistic missile technology.

The others are the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, China and Israel.

Mr. Kalam denied reports that Agni could be equipped with nuclear warheads. The missile could carry only conventional warheads, he said.

The scientists reiterated that Agni's test, which has aroused fears in the United States of a missile arms race in South Asia, was a technology demonstration and not the induction of a new weapons system.

The missile would need further tests before reaching the operational stage, they said.

Mr. Arunachalam said the 14-tonne Agni had reached a range of about 1,000 kilometres (600 miles), although it has a potential range of 2,500 kilometres (1,560 miles), during Monday's test and added that its accuracy had exceeded expectations.

No difficulties were encountered in manoeuvring the transition from a first stage solid propulsions system to the second stage liquid propellant, he said. The heat shield withstood the extremely high temperatures generated during the test.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has said that Agni would give New Delhi an effective non-nuclear deterrent with its ability to deliver non-nuclear warheads with high precision at long ranges.

India's missile development programme was launched in 1983, 11 years after India reportedly abandoned Project Devil—aimed at building a family of missiles and step up indigenous defence production.

Project Devil, employing 800 experts and costing 770 million dollars, was reportedly scuttled because it was found to be over-ambitious. But the government never announced the decision.

Scientist on Dec Launch

*BK2705035689 Delhi Domestic Service in English
0240 GMT 27 May 89*

[Text] The scientific adviser to the defense minister, Dr V.S. Arunachalam, has said that the medium-range surface-to-air missile Akash [Sky] is expected to be launched by December this year. Addressing a news conference in New Delhi yesterday, he said the main purpose of the test launching of the long-range missile Agni [Fire] was basically to establish the designing of heat shield for reentry inertial navigation system and change of propulsion from stage one to stage two.

Dr Arunachalam said the successful launching has proved that India has acquired the vital reentry technology which would give a big boost to the integrated missile development program.

The third generation antitank missile Nag [Cobra] is currently going through flight test trials, he said.

PAKISTAN

Army Chief Justifies Concern Over Indian Missiles

BK1305163089 Islamabad Domestic Service in English 1600 GMT 13 May 89

[Text] The chief of the Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, has said Pakistan's concern over the Indian missile Agni is quite genuine. However, Pakistan has been able to acquire its own capability to counter such threats with the development of its series of missiles. Addressing officers of the School of Infantry and (?Tactics) in Quetta today, he said the threat to Pakistan from the Agni missile, which has a range of over 2,500 km, is not as relevant as the threat from [India's] Kirti missile having a range of over 300 km. He said Pakistan has a limited territorial gap and Kirti missile can reach targets in Pakistan, while Agni may be aimed at targets much beyond it, which could well be in China, Soviet Union, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the (?Gulf).

About Afghanistan, General Aslam Beg was confident that the (?will) of the Afghan people will triumph. Now that the war of liberation is reaching its final and logical conclusion, it is the people of Afghanistan who have to settle the problems, he added.

**22 Units, Including 13th Guards Tank,
Withdrawing From Hungary**
*18010646 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in
Russian 26 Apr 89 p 3*

[By A. Kaverznev: "Homeward Bound!"]

[Text] In accordance with the decision of the Soviet government, a withdrawal of a part of our forces from the territory of the HPR [People's Republic of Hungary] began yesterday.

Without doubt, the Kishkunkhalash installation, 150 km south of Budapest, has never undergone such an invasion of foreign journalists. Two "Ikarus" buses packed full, dozens of cars—140 people in all, representing the world's major publications, press agencies, and television companies. Frankly speaking, the correspondents' visit was not planned in advance. The first rail train of combat equipment was to be sent off quietly, but the journalists insisted on being present. The significance of this event was tremendous—the dispatch to the motherland of the first tank battalion within the framework of the unilateral withdrawal of a part of USSR forces and armaments from the territories of the GDR, CSSR, and HPR, announced by the Soviet leader at the speaker's platform of the United Nations.

In all 22 units are being withdrawn from Hungary, among them the 13th Guards Tank Division at full strength, a tank training regiment, a airborne assault battalion, a fighter air regiment, a chemical defense battalion, a school for lower-rank specialist personnel, and other detached units. This information was announced by Colonel General M.P. Burlakov, Commander of the Southern Group of Forces, at a press conference in Budapest.

The first complement left the loading area at Kishkunkhalash at 1210 on 25 April. The tanks, sounding their deep-voiced horns, drove one after another onto a trestle, and from there to railroad flatcars. The lead vehicle was entrusted to Private Shukhrat Ergashev. Before the Army he worked as a tractor driver in the village of Bozaryk in Chimkent Oblast, and in the Army he made the transition to the steering lever of a combat vehicle and became a rated specialist. He did not leave the flatcar, despite the assault of the journalists, until the tank was secured firmly. But afterwards he immediately became a celebrity. The correspondents also surrounded the regimental commander Lieutenant Colonel V.B. Zaytsev. What is the fate of the unit entrusted to him?

"The regiment will be deactivated [rasformirovan]. Part of the equipment will be sent to storage bases, part will be turned over to the national economy, and part, apparently, will be melted down. The officers will continue to serve in other units; it has already been determined just where each will be sent."

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Complaints Heard on Soviet Maneuver Observer Behavior

52002422 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 1 Apr 89 p 3

[Article by Guenther Gillessen: "German Complaints About Soviet Inspection Practices Show Results"]

[Text] Bonn, 31 March—For the past 2 years, since 1 January 1987, the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] states have had the opportunity to gather experience on the "confidence-building measures" under the Stockholm CDE [Conference on Confidence-Building and Security Measures in Europe] Agreements—the announcement, observation and inspection of major military exercises. These experiences differ widely, because East and West not only use a different approach to the conduct of military maneuvers, but also because the Eastern states are pursuing different objectives for their right of inspection of NATO territory.

GDR ground force maneuvers are preponderantly conducted in troop training areas rather than in the open, as is the case in the FRG. The GDR has always had more (a total of 49) training areas, and bigger ones. Some of these are suitable for exercises by entire divisions; the biggest one in the FRG can accommodate one brigade at best. The Eastern armies conducted more medium-sized exercises, none of them exceeding participation by 25,000 men; the Western states held fewer exercises, but their largest ones involved up to 130,000 military personnel.

The Stockholm Agreement provides that every European state must give advance notification to all other states of major military movements and activities of ground or air forces outside their garrisons, as follows: at least 6 weeks for exercises involving more than 13,000 personnel or 3,000 in case of amphibious or parachute landings, and 2 years in advance where 40,000 personnel are involved. Beyond that, all states have pledged to invite all other states to observe their maneuvers if they involve more than 17,000 personnel (about one division), or 5,000 in case of amphibious or airborne landing exercises. Beyond that, the Agreement permits every participating state to "inspect" maneuvers in another country once every year.

The Guest Decides

The difference between "maneuver observation" and "inspection" is significant. All participating states are invited to observe maneuvers. However, the host decides which parts of an exercise he wishes to show to the foreign maneuver guests. He decides on location, duration and the amount of information about the daily maneuver situation. He provides transportation; he is in charge.

The opposite is true for "inspections" to verify adherence to the Agreement. The guest decides what he wants to see, at what time and in which areas, on land or in the air, within a total period of 48 hours. His wishes must not be interfered with, so long as his desires comply with the provisions of the Agreement, i.e., if they concern armed forces in motion "outside their garrisons." Thus the interior of vehicles, visits to depots and barracks are not included. Equipment itself is not the subject of these verification measures; only whether major troop movements are indeed designed for training rather than for mobilization and preparation for an invasion.

It turns out that for 1989 East and West plan fewer exercises requiring notification (with more than 13,000 personnel) than in the past—17 exercises, compared with 21 in 1988 and 25 in 1987 in the Warsaw Pact and, for NATO, 11 for 1989 versus 15 each in 1988 and 1987. Many states took advantage of the right to mutual maneuver inspection. The FRG accepted every obligatory invitation to major maneuvers by the Eastern states. The Western countries took the opportunity to provide all unclassified information to Eastern observers about their armed forces and the developing situations of their exercises—considerably more than required by the Stockholm Agreement—so as to provide them with full information on the objective of the maneuver and thus to contribute to the goal of the Agreement, to "build confidence."

The same was not true on the other side. Western observers noted that Eastern units practiced with fictitious unit designations or covered identification numbers; peacetime bases were kept secret; helicopter flights over the exercise terrain were almost always denied; new major equipment was seldom shown; night observation not offered; opportunities for interviewing high-ranking military commanders hardly provided and information provided was of such general nature that the observers could only guess at the actual course of events of the exercises. The Eastern side adhered strictly to the minimum requirements of the Agreements. Nevertheless, Western observers considered the events to be profitable.

Inspection experience to date is however the most interesting. During the first year this measure was used only with hesitation; twice by the Western side (Americans and British at exercises by the Soviet Army in Byelorussia and in the GDR) and three times by the East (twice during U.S.-Bundeswehr exercises by the USSR and the GDR and once during a Turkish maneuver by the USSR). In 1988 both sides became more uninhibited—there was a total of 13 inspections, 6 by NATO countries, 7 by Warsaw Pact states.

The first, and thus far only, inspection by a Bundeswehr team took place at a Soviet maneuver in the GDR in August 1988. The Soviet exercise command provided little information beyond what had been stated in the announcement. Identifying insignia on tank turrets were

obscured, Soviet officers and enlisted men were forbidden to answer questions as to their bases. The Soviet escort officers had no information, or even wrong information, about the course of the exercise. The West German officers were less than satisfied with the results of this "inspection."

Intentions of Espionage

Conversely, the German escort officers of a Soviet inspection team at a maneuver in September 1988 in the Wuerzburg-Stuttgart-Merzig-Zimmern area noted that the Soviets were not particularly interested in the events of the current maneuvers, but rather in reconnoitering military installations in the FRG—just as had been the case in October 1987. They were entitled to determine their own itinerary, which led remarkably close to such installations as Pershing missile sites. They were "inspecting" day and night, hardly sleeping at all, for 36 hours; this left them another 12 hours for being briefed on the maneuver situation and for visiting the troops in the field.

This misses the objective of an inspection, to identify the objective of all major maneuvers. It is missed also if Western CDE inspectors cannot even determine the unit identification and home bases of the exercising troops. They can of course count the visible soldiers and combat vehicles and thus calculate the order of magnitude of the maneuver. But the inspectors are unable to determine whether these are troops exercising near their bases or whether these are units brought in from distant bases which could form part of a covert deployment. "Confidence" can hardly be built that way.

Participating Bundeswehr offices voiced their experiences with Soviet inspectors to officers of other Warsaw Pact states. It was noted thereafter that GDR and Polish officers at subsequent maneuvers in the West took pains to obtain briefings on the exercise concerned, only established their itineraries after that, accepted any briefing offered and limited their observation requests correctly to the maneuver events. In all this their practices compared favorably with those of the Soviets. This has resulted in the creation of professional habits in maneuver observations.

In the summer of 1988 the FRG complained in a note to the USSR about the behavior of the Soviet CDE inspectors, with copies to all other participants of the CDE Agreement.

The USSR replied with accusations against the Western powers, that the Fall 1988 maneuvers by the Bundeswehr and the allies did not constitute individual exercises, as announced, but that they were in fact an assembly of a total of 175,000 personnel, who had exercised a "joint overall idea." Further, that a maneuver of that magnitude should have been announced 2 years previously. The FRG Government rejected this accusation, stating

that these were separate national exercises by the Bundeswehr and the Americans, and that common "ideas" were not prohibited.

Nevertheless, it turned out that German complaints about the secretiveness of Eastern maneuver commands and the abuse of the rights of inspection by Soviet officers had shown results. At subsequent maneuvers in October 1988 in England, the Soviet CDE inspectors showed greater cooperation.

CDE maneuver observation and inspection currently costs the FRG DM5 million annually. This includes the cost for the personnel of a CDE section in the department of defense, as well as the cost of feeding, housing and transporting the foreign observers and inspectors on FRG territory. These costs will increase upon the forthcoming activation of a Bundeswehr CDE Observer Group, and even more if the arms reduction negotiations in Vienna should be successful, resulting in a greater need for verification.

Suessmuth Stresses Bonn's Reliability in NATO

AU1905181889 Hamburg *DIE WELT* in German
19 May 89 p 1

[“hrk” report: “No Solo Attempt by Bonn”]

[Text] There is no reason for questioning "the FRG's reliability as an alliance partner" or for speaking of the danger of a "solo attempt by the Germans." This was stressed by Bundestag President Rita Suessmuth (Christian Democratic Union) at an official meeting yesterday [18 May] of the government and the Berlin Senat, held on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the FRG at the Berlin Reichstag building.

Referring to this issue, which has recently been receiving particular attention abroad, she stressed that this is "an ordinary foreign policy procedure, aimed at seeking a joint security and peace concept among the NATO partners." Regarding far-Right parties, the politician warned emphatically against those who "are losing sight of the whole and want to embark on a nationalist path." She described the "unrestricted yes to democracy as a precondition for freedom of every individual German and the unity of our nation" as the the government's credo.

Kohl, Spain's Gonzalez Discuss Missiles, EC

LD2205163389 Hamburg DPA in German 1523 GMT
22 May 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the Spanish head of government Felipe Gonzalez met today in Bonn for an exchange of opinions. In his capacity as acting EC Council president, Gonzalez is currently making a round of the community partners to improve the chances of a successful EC summit on 26 to 27 June in Madrid.

The talk with Kohl is likely to focus on questions of currency union, tax harmonization, the further development of the internal market and the European social charter. Kohl also hoped to inform Gonzalez of Germany's position in the missile controversy with the United States and Great Britain. In relation to this, the chancellor announced that he had sent a new letter to U.S. President George Bush on 22 May.

The chancellor told the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] party of the Federal Assembly, which meets tomorrow to elect a new head of state, that the Federal Government will do all in its power to help strengthen NATO. Only a strong alliance can ensure peace and freedom. "We are not in favor of a third zero option or the denuclearization of Europe." Bonn does, however, advocate negotiations on short-range missiles, which represent a particular problem for Germans.

Agreement on EC, NATO Issues

LD2205192289 Hamburg DPA in German 1745 GMT
22 May 89

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Spanish head of government Felipe Gonzalez have reached agreement on important issues relating to the EC and NATO. This was stated by both politicians after a meeting in Bonn Monday [22 May]. The FRG capital was the first stop for Gonzalez on a tour of the capitals of the Community prior to the EC summit in Madrid on 26 and 27 June.

Kohl told journalists afterward that he had also talked to Gonzalez about the NATO summit in Brussels next week. During the talk, the view was expressed that the governments of the two countries have a shared interest in an agreed and convincing decision for an overall NATO strategy. Kohl would not give any details. "We are still in the process of dialogue, also with our partners in NATO."

The chancellor announced that on Monday he sent U.S. President George Bush a letter setting out German ideas on the solution of the missile dispute. He intends to talk to Bush about this on the telephone in the next few days. He also refused to comment on this point, as the dialogue is still going on. Gonzalez reminded his audience that at the time he supported the FRG Government on counterarming. He took a lot of criticism for this. "In the meantime the winds from the East are blowing a little differently." The NATO summit in Brussels is of great political importance.

Asked about U.S. threats to withdraw U.S. troops from Europe if there is a third zero solution, Kohl said that Bonn is interested in a strong alliance. The FRG is contributing to this, even when it means making sacrifices. U.S. soldiers in the FRG are also defending the

freedom of the United States. He had "not picked up" such threats from leading members of the American government. [passage omitted]

Kohl and Gonzalez, who are continuing their talks over dinner this evening, stressed their shared desire to make the EC summit in Madrid a success. They said the topics would be currency union, tax harmonization, further development of the internal market, and its social orientation. Gonzalez said coooperation with the FRG Government is extraordinarily important for his country. There is a great deal of agreement with Bonn on how Europe should be structured. [passage omitted]

'Quarrel' With Washington on Missiles Continues

AU2305192289 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 23 May 89 pp 1-2

[Report by "C.G.": "Bonn Insists on Negotiations in Foreseeable Time"]

[Text] Bonn, 22 May—A week prior to the Brussels NATO meeting and U.S. President Bush's visit to the Federal Republic, the quarrel between Bonn and Washington over missiles is continuing. Federal Chancellor Kohl sent Bush a cable on Monday [22 May] in response to a paper in which the U.S. Administration, in talks with Defense Minister Stoltenberg on Friday last week [19 May], expounded its ideas about the preconditions for negotiations on short-range missiles with the Soviet Union. No rapprochement has been achieved by the exchange of letters on the decisive point, the timing of the beginning of such negotiations. The Federal Government originally said it wanted "negotiations soon" between the United States and the Soviet Union on the subject of short-range missiles. Washington and London at first did not want negotiations to come about at all, if possible, and finally said that there would only be negotiations if results had been achieved in other areas of disarmament. In the text that Stoltenberg discussed with Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher in Bonn on Sunday [21 May], the United States demands not only the conclusion of the Vienna negotiations on conventional stability from the Atlantic to the Urals, but also the implementation of a corresponding agreement. In agreement with Genscher, Stoltenberg, and the Christian Social Union [CSU], Kohl says in his answer that the Federal Government cannot agree to an approach that is tantamount to the postponement of East-West missile negotiations for an unforeseeable length of time. Commenting on the U.S. position, a person involved in the discussions told this newspaper: "They cannot do this with the Federal Republic." He added that Bonn insists on the proposal to bring about negotiations in a foreseeable period of time.

After having sent his cable, Kohl tried to reach understanding with Bush in a telephone conversation. On Monday [22 May] evening, the federal chancellor also discussed the way to deal with the missile issue within the scope of the planned overall NATO concept with

Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez, who was in Bonn to prepare for the European Council meeting in Madrid in June. Genscher was in Brussels, trying to reach agreement with the foreign ministers of the other 11 EC countries on a compromise solution to the missile issue. Bonn considers Great Britain to be more hard-line on this matter than the United States.

The hopeful statements of Presidents Bush and Mitterrand on Sunday [21 May] about the possibility of agreement within the alliance prior to the Brussels meeting were received with caution in Bonn. "We are not yet over the hill," sources in Bonn said. They added that the Federal Government will continue to try to achieve agreement, step by step. Like Kohl, Bush "pledged" that efforts are being made to settle the matter, these sources said. Bonn sources indicated that the U.S. formula about the "implementation" of a Vienna conventional arms agreement prior to the beginning of missile negotiations has been assessed as an unreasonable demand.

However, the Federal Government apparently agrees to the modification—requested by Washington—of a sentence in the Bonn coalition decision to postpone the decision on modernizing short-range missiles. The sentence originally said that a decision should be made in 1992 on whether "or not" it would be necessary to introduce and consequently produce and deploy a Lance follow-up system in the alliance in 1996. Washington wants to have the two words "or not" canceled to rule out the possibility of a third zero solution. Sources in Bonn said that the words "or not" only reflected what was said earlier in the same statement and were therefore unnecessary.

Following talks with U.S. Ambassador Walters, Alfred Dregger, Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union Bundestag floor leader, said that "quite a bit of work" must still be done "before we will have reached a common alliance position on a disarmament initiative in the short-range area to overcome the Soviet Union's superiority in this field." The Germans cannot accept this Soviet superiority, he said, adding: "Therefore, it must be our goal to reduce armaments on both sides to a minimum level necessary for deterrence—in other words, to common upper ceilings under the present NATO stocks."

Egon Bahr, presidium member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD], said that the U.S. position, whereby negotiations would begin only "after the accords reached in Vienna on the first disarmament step have been implemented," is unacceptable. He said that such a position represented a postponement of negotiations by at least 4-6 years. Horst Ehmke, SPD Bundestag deputy floor leader, reproached the Federal Government for "yielding" to Washington.

Bush's 'Great Initiative' Assessed

AU3005164189 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
30 May 89 p 2

[Article by Herbert Kremp: "Bush's Surprise"]

[Text] Almost immediately after the beginning of the first council session in Brussels on Monday [29 May], the Atlantic alliance gave the impression that the ice was broken. U.S. President George Bush has ended what some regarded as the "long and terrible" period of the interregnum of ideas, and emerged with his own disarmament plan that has stimulated the people's imagination and provided material for the media. The allies were briefed on the details of the plan only last weekend so that the momentum of a positive surprise was added to Bush's initiative.

However, in his first press conference Bush bluntly rejected allegations that the United States is now imitating Gorbachev's method of continually coming out with new evidence of "new thinking." He counts on reliability and agreement within the alliance. His initiative is a serious attempt to end the lengthy discussions of the past few months with a creative move, and give a dynamic, future-oriented impetus to the unity of the alliance. He set up a building that is to allot only a small apartment to the controversy over short-range nuclear missiles, so to speak. In his address to NATO's heads of government he did not say one word about the short-range weapons.

Before the beginning of the Vienna talks on establishing a balance of conventional forces in Europe, the Western powers agreed not to start out from the numbers of soldiers, but from the offensive strength of heavy armaments. The quality of the fighter planes (and helicopters) was not to be compared either in the initial phase.

Bush's proposal on Monday is the signal for a change in thinking: The troop strength of both superpowers in Europe is to be reduced to 275,000 men for each side. For the NATO forces this means a reduction of 20 percent. Thus, the United States would have to withdraw 65,000 men and the USSR 325,000. In addition, Bush also proposed reducing the number of fighter planes by 15 percent (excluding long-range U.S. and French aircraft). This proposal will cause the gravest doubts among military officials.

Bush could be sure of the consent of the allied heads of government. The tone of this consent differed according to the temperament and the position of the individual states. The British voiced a cool "yes," France will "study" the proposals, whereas Helmut Kohl spoke of a "great initiative for the rapid reduction of conventional arms." Now the details have to be given time to show their effect. It seems to be clear that the United States will fully claim for itself the financial relief that results

from reducing the number of men following the conventional talks in Vienna. This means that for the first time since the founding of NATO, U.S. Forces—25 percent—will be withdrawn from Europe.

The German term, a political “turn of the tides,” is bound to come to one’s mind in this context. Will it only be limited disarmament contingents or did Bush give the marching orders for the start of further troop reductions? Irrespective of his intention, for the time being, Bush has saved the alliance from suffering an infarct and prevented it from being transferred to the intensive care unit. The time limit that the U.S. President has set for the success of his new proposals in Vienna, namely 6 to 12 months, can be of decisive importance for the lengthy discussion on short-range nuclear weapons. Considering the speed of political clocks this is “early.” The Germans, who for fear of the missiles almost went as far as causing an open conflict within the alliance, can now hope that “then,” when this time limit for “early” negotiations will have been reached the alliance will also agree on a negotiating mandate for the tactical nuclear weapons, which are putting great strain on the political situation at home.

Is this really going to be the case? Bush’s changed disarmament strategy is of course aimed at calming the Germans who came to Brussels inflated with outward self-assuredness but with butterflies in their stomachs. He strengthened Kohl’s position (toward his “nuclear” foreign minister), and provided him and the alliance with new room to maneuver, or—as some have put it—with new toys. However, he made it quite clear that first, negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons are out of the question for the moment; second, Europe cannot generally do without nuclear weapons. Bush, Mrs Thatcher, and Mitterrand have categorically rejected a third zero option for tactical nuclear weapons in their declaration to the NATO plenary session.

One has to wait until the end of the summit conference to be able to see whether Bush’s initiative has really defused the missile controversy. The front of continental states, which Bonn tried to set up against the Americans and British in a kind of desperate haste, has turned out to be nothing but rumor or ineffective bustle, which the first day of the NATO summit proved. The West’s disarmament policy was led back from Bonn’s narrow alley to the wide road of its real importance. Under the leadership of the United States the alliance has proved to be flexible. Now it remains to be seen whether German domestic policy is able to rise to this occasion.

Kohl on Relations With U.S.

LD3005141689 Hamburg DPA in German 1332 GMT
30 May 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has praised the foundation of German-U.S. relations as “sound and strong.” During the dinner given in honor of U.S. President George Bush, he emphasized in his toast

on Tuesday evening: “We are united by the conviction that a political order can exist only when it is based on respect for freedom and human dignity, based on law and justice.”

This is what German-U.S. friendship hinges on “even if today and in future we have to deal with differences of view on this or that political issue,” the chancellor said. He thus reacted to U.S. voices that German-U.S. relations are being subjected to a change, and that the Germans—according to the chancellor—“look allegedly romantically dreamlike, to the East.” Concerning this point he elucidated: “This is a caricature and does not reflect reality.”

However, according to his words it is natural that the Germans, as a divided people, follow with special attention the developments in central, eastern and south eastern Europe: “However, we would not dream of putting the unshakable guidelines of our policy up for discussion.” This includes the friendly and close cooperation with the United States, the Atlantic alliance as the “guarantor of our freedom and security,” and the EC.

Addressing Bush directly, Kohl said: “Mr President, our U.S. friends may rely on this: The Federal Republic of Germany’s strong anchorage within the West is irrevocable.” The chancellor said, “We are no wanderers between two worlds.” The German issue he calls a historic challenge in which the German fate is bound to the overall West-East relations. A free and united Germany can become reality only in a free and united Europe.

Some 2 weeks before the visit by the Soviet head of state and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev to the Federal Republic, Kohl assessed the development in Eastern Europe positively. He expressed the hope that the changes taking place there will bring for the peoples a piece of genuine democracy, more prosperity through the market economy, but above all more rights and more openness. The Federal Republic is prepared to make her contribution toward it “to promote this reform process through a future-oriented policy of dialogue and cooperation.”

At the same time the chancellor underlined the need to continue a policy which has as its goal to serve “peace in assured freedom.” Disarmament and arms control are “no substitute for safeguarded defense capability.” With the NATO comprehensive concept for arms control and disarmament agreed in Brussels this morning, the alliance has at its disposal “elements of a common political strategy for the coming years,” Kohl said without going into details. On the issue of defense expenditure—Bonn and Washington will have to make the biggest payments within NATO for the common security—Kohl signalled that “we do not evade a discussion on a just distribution of the costs.” However, Federal citizens should not be overtaxed.

Kohl, Bush Meet Journalists After Talks
*LD3005183589 Hamburg DPA in German 1645 GMT
30 May 89*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—In the words of Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, relations with the United States of America will in the future remain “of vital importance” to the Federal Republic. After his hour-long meeting with U.S. President George Bush, Kohl underlined to journalists this evening the importance of Bush’s visit to the Federal Republic. He praised him as a “proven friend of our country” as well as a personal friend who has given him help and support in times of difficulty.

In particular, the chancellor emphasized the latest disarmament proposal from the U.S. President in the area of conventional weapons, describing it as a “mighty step forward”. This proposal bears witness to the inspiration emanating from the U.S. leadership. It was a “clever, important decision at the right time”. With reference to the Soviet Union, he said that it is now up to the other side to grasp the outstretched hand. Then it will become a “work of peace”.

Subjects discussed in the talks, which took place immediately after the official greeting by Federal President Richard von Weizsaecker, included, according to Kohl, the forthcoming EC internal market and the stepping-up of German-U.S. school and student exchanges. The chancellor rejected U.S. concerns that the internal market could lead to a separation. There will not be a new “Fortress Europe” with fixed trade barriers. The Federal Republic will continue to campaign for free world trade.

U.S. President Bush said that he does not believe German-U.S. relations have ever been better. He was extremely gratified by the response to the NATO compromise. The decision shows that the alliance is standing together in a united, strong way. In challenging the Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev, NATO has demonstrated that it wants to bring about progress. The alliance has moved in the right direction. The initiative lies in the interests of NATO, the United States of America, the alliance members and lastly, as well as in the interests of the Soviet Union itself.

In response to a relevant question, Kohl said that there were only winners in Brussels. With a compromise reached, the alliance has given itself the best present for its 40th anniversary. Following difficult discussions a joint decision was reached. Everyone had to make compromises in their private lives. This happened in Brussels. Therefore, there were “only victors”. Politicians seldom have the opportunity to say this. “I’m enjoying that”. Asked whether the decision would help win elections, Kohl said he is quite certain of that in the 1990 [Bundestag] elections. It helps the Federal Republic to have a government and a government leader whose friendship with the United States of America has been tried and tested.

In response to questions, Bush indicated that he will address the Berlin question in his speech in Mainz Wednesday [31 May]

Weizsaecker Comments on Bush Meeting
*LD3005171889 Hamburg DPA in German 1539 GMT
30 May 89*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal President Richard von Weizsaecker praised the NATO compromise on disarmament policy as an initiative from the West, which constitutes an opportunity “that should be recognized and should not be passed up.” The reactions from the West and from the Warsaw Pact shows that “this initiative can and must be taken seriously”, Von Weizsaecker said in an interview with ARD [German television] after his meeting with U.S. President Bush.

The Atlantic alliance has proved, “not for the first time”, that the preparation “is not simple, but nevertheless possible”, and can reach a “credible result”. Because the whole affair is being played out in public, everybody can see who is taking what position, said Von Weizsaecker, speaking of the public discussions.

Party Chairmen Respond to Bush Visit
*LD3005165689 Hamburg DPA in German 1608 GMT
30 May 89*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The CDU-CSU and SPD Bundestag groups have underlined the importance of the U.S. President’s visit to the Federal Republic. Alfred Dregger, the CDU-CSU lower house group chairman told union parliamentarians: “We welcome him as our friend, who was once again prepared at the Brussels summit to respect our German interests within the alliance.” Hans-Jochen Vogel, the SPD Party and lower house group chairman, referred to the fact that, dependent upon Bush’s commitment is not only the further development of German-U.S. relations, but also the continuation of the peace process and the beginning of a system-opening cooperation between East and West.

Baker Justification of SNF Stance Cited
*LD3005214189 Hamburg DPA in German 1832 GMT
30 May 89*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker has conceded that negotiations on a partial reduction in short-range nuclear weapons in Europe could begin before a decision has been reached on their modernization. Baker justified this in Bonn this evening on grounds that the negotiating goal of achieving an agreement on troops in Vienna within a year was “optimistic but not unrealistic.”

The decision on modernization is to be made after a decision on the NATO summit in 1992. The secretary of state added that whether or not modernization takes place would also be determined by whether there was a

"political following" for it. This was dependent on factors such as further developments in the USSR and on disarmament. All this would enter into the political calculations.

Baker did not exclude "permanently" a complete removal of the missiles. But the negotiations now under discussion were clearly only concerned with partial reductions. This was not a matter for arguments about interpretation.

Summit Commentary: 'New Elan'

AU3005082489 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 30 May 89 p 1

[["Nm" commentary: "Bush's Offer"]]

[Text] With his disarmament proposal to the Warsaw Pact President Bush has provided new elan to the Western alliance and has refuted those critics in the United States who accused him of lacking leadership qualities. In the United States, too, his first speeches on East-West relations were felt to be disappointing, or at least not the appropriate result of a comprehensive study of U.S. foreign policy which had taken 4 paralyzing months. With the offer to Moscow to agree in the short-term on the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet troops from foreign territories Bush took the wind out of the sails of those senators and deputies in Washington who are in favor of a unilateral U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe in particular for budgetary reasons.

Bush's initiative saved a NATO anniversary meeting, which all participants had anticipated with a somber mood because of the quarrel about short-range missiles. The schedule, which Bush envisaged for the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe (CFE), may sound optimistic; but it now depends on the Soviet Union whether this schedule will be observed: an agreement within a year with the subsequent implementation of the agreed reduction of troops and materiel without delay, then talks on short-range nuclear weapons—if foreign and security policy reason has not been completely lost in Bonn, this can be made compatible with the FRG call for "early" negotiations.

With Bush's proposal NATO might be able to prove that it is not "stalling" concerning disarmament. In Vienna, the Western disarmament concept is being negotiated; Soviet offers have basically been a rapprochement to the proposal submitted by NATO. However, the Western alliance has never been able to make this connection clear to the public. This is a matter of "sales strategy": A proposal made by the U.S. President has a different effect on the audience than a negotiation concept worked out in every detail by diplomats and military men. After some hesitation Bush seems to have decided in favor of a foreign policy that is boldly shaping the future. Now it is Gorbachev's turn to respond.

Press Views on Bush NATO Summit Proposal

AU3005203589 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0505 GMT 30 May 89

[From the Press Review]

[Text] The OFFENBACH-POST comments: Yesterday in Brussels will in all probability go down in history. Forty-four years after the end of the war, the United States is ready to withdraw one-fifth of its combat forces, that is 10 percent of its total troops strength, from Europe. Thus, after months and years of hesitation, the West has taken the reins if? its hands and is no longer yielding to Gorbachev in the struggle to make headlines. Approximately 30,000 soldiers less in Western Europe, 325,000 soldiers less on the other side of the Wall, and, thus, equal ceilings on both sides: This would really be a step toward peace, the OFFENBACH-POST stresses.

In the opinion of the MAIN-POST published in Wuerzburg, Bush's proposal has also taken the edge of the missile conflict between Bonn and Washington. Quote: Thus, the psychological pressure to which the two superpowers are exposed, that is, to outdo each other in front of the world public by increasingly revolutionary jokers of troops withdrawals and scrapping, has gained dynamics of its own which can hardly be curbed so quickly. And it looks as if the German participants could also credit the Brussels congress to their account: If a quick agreement is reached during the Vienna talks, there will be no reason for the Americans to object to early negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles, the MAIN-POST comments.

The BERLINER MORGENPOST also takes up this aspect: It is in the nature of the matter that Bush's initiative also takes the edge of the missile conflict between Bonn and Washington. A trace of a compromise was in the air 1 day before the President's arrival on the Rhine. Now even the Bonn foreign minister, the inventor of Genscherism, can no longer pretend that Washington has devoted itself to immobility at the expense of vital German interests, the BERLINER MORGENPOST points out.

In the opinion of the KOELNISCHE RUNDSCHAU, Bush's advance also shows understanding for the Federal Government's position: Late, much too late, Washington has realized that Bonn cannot simply give in on all points in the missile conflict with the United States which has occupied the NATO partners and the world public for weeks. It was generally known that, in view of its present domestic situation, the Federal Government was neither able nor willing to make a decision on the modernization of short-range missiles in Europe. U.S. President George Bush has offered the Soviet Union the withdrawal of 20 percent of U.S. combat forces in Europe, to prevent the shadows which are heavily weighing on this NATO summit in Brussels and on the 40th anniversary of the Western alliance from becoming longer and gloomier. Undoubtedly, this was not intended as a step in the

direction of FRG positions in this significant conflict. For, with this offer to the Soviets, the U.S. President not only wants to accelerate the conventional disarmament negotiations in Vienna, but also to take them to concrete agreements as soon as possible, in order to comply with German demands for early negotiations at least to some extent, the KOELNISCHE RUNDSCHAU stresses.

The STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG presents certain reservations about Washington's proposals: Whether Bush's bold schedule can be observed, is quite a different matter. Thus, British Prime Minister Thatcher is full of doubts and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher also sees himself overrun by the leading NATO power. Yet Bonn has no choice but to take the ball which has been passed to it across the Atlantic. For the first time since Gorbachev's assumption of power, NATO seems to have again taken over in the disarmament dialogue, the STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG says.

The BRAUNSCHWEIGER ZEITUNG comments on the offered withdrawal of U.S. soldiers from the following point of view: In addition, Bush's initiative also contains a less agreeable aspect for Bonn. The withdrawal of GI's directly concerns the Germans' security interest. Now Washington is officially intimating this, without consulting Bonn. This is a warning to all those who, with the ring of national sovereignty, think that they are able to counteract our most important protecting power without consequences.

CDU/CSU Praise Summit Accord
*LD3005113189 Hamburg DPA in German 1004 GMT
30 May 89*

[Text] Bonn, (DPA)—Alfred Dregger, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union [CDU]/Christian Social Union [CSU] Lower House Groups, praised the Brussels accord as a "balanced compromise which meets German interests as well as the alliance interests." The clarity of the German position was largely responsible for the success. However, once NATO decided on the modernization of its nuclear short-range missiles in 1992, negotiations should also be conducted on nuclear artillery. Dregger called for a drastic reduction of these weapons systems which are of "doubtful military use."

The CSU group chairman, Wolfgang Beotsch, said that the foreign ministers and heads of government of the NATO countries have found a compromise which takes into account the interests of the whole alliance.

In contrast Juergen Maier, executive member of the Greens, said that the NATO decision permits the United States to pursue the development and procurement of a successor-system of the Lance short-range missiles, thus creating something tangible [und damit fakten zu schaffen].

Parties' Reaction To Summit Largely Favorable
*AU3005123789 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 1100 GMT 30 May 89*

[Dieter Kopp report from Bonn]

[Text] The Brussels compromise has met with different reactions in Bonn. While the parties are largely in agreement on Bush's proposals, they differ on the interpretation of the formula on short-range missiles. On the one hand, the concept has been called tolerable and absolutely acceptable; on the other, disappointment has been expressed in particular by the opposition. Whereas the government coalition stressed that it was the clear German position which contributed decisively to the success of the alliance, the opposition criticized that there was a clear discrepancy between the compromise formula adopted and the Federal Government's original position.

Alfred Dregger, Bundestag floor leader of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, demanded that nuclear artillery shells must be included in future negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles. He said that we will use our contacts with our allies to make our position known. At the same time, Dregger said he hoped that the agreement reached in Brussels would give NATO new strength.

Hans-Jochen Vogel, chairman of the Social Democratic Party, said that he did not believe that the original German demands had been met. The opposition leader told journalists in Bonn this morning [30 May] that neither could an early beginning of negotiations on a reduction in short-range missiles be expected, nor were simultaneous negotiations on conventional weapons and missiles being considered. The Brussels agreement represented a risk regarding the time factor and did not guarantee a result of negotiations prior to 1992, which would spare us the deployment of new short-range missiles, stressed Vogel, adding that the resolution adopted at the Free Democratic Party [FDP] Congress last weekend [27-28 May] was not in line with the Brussels agreement either.

Wolfgang Mischnick, FDP Bundestag floor leader, was very satisfied, however. He said that the aspects that German policy contributed and pursued persistently obviously convinced the conferees in Brussels. He added that the proposals now had to be followed by practical action as quickly as possible.

Stoltenberg Endorses Summit Result
*LD3005142689 Hamburg DPA in German 1327 GMT
30 May 89*

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—The agreement of NATO on a common disarmament concept was noted in Bonn today by all the coalition parties with approval and relief. [passage omitted]

Federal Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg [Christian Democratic Union] emphasized that the summit succeeded in making the unity within the alliance once again clear after a critical discussion. According to Stoltenberg, the comprehensive concept presented by U.S. President George Bush could be the basis for solving the problems concerning short-range missiles. The "major points" of the German position were taken into account in Brussels. [passage omitted]

Kohl Interviewed on Outcome of NATO Summit
*AU3005194589 Mainz ZDF Television Service
in German 1700 GMT 30 May 89*

[Interview with Chancellor Helmut Kohl by unidentified reporter in Brussels on 30 May—recorded]

[Text] [Question] There are still plans for negotiations to partially reduce short-range missiles. Is the third zero solution therefore out?

[Kohl] As I stated in the Bundestag debate, under the present circumstances, this will not be an issue in the foreseeable future. However, none of us knows what will happen in the more distant future.

[Question] According to reports, there were considerable conflicts in Bonn on Bonn's course. Has a possible coalition dispute been prevented now?

[Kohl] No, there was no dispute within the coalition. In my own party, but not in the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union Bundestag Group, there were some who made comments. They will have to ask themselves today whether it was wise to have made those comments. And, of course, there were discussions within the coalition parties. Think, for example, of the discussion before the Free Democratic Party Congress. However, from my point of view, there has never been an actual coalition crisis. And nobody has ever tried to engage me in such a crisis.

Weizsaecker on Bush, Missile Issue, East Bloc
*AU3105080989 Hamburg BILD in German
31 May 89 p 2*

[Interview with FRG President Richard von Weizsaecker by Wolfgang Kenntemich in Bonn; date not given: "Are We Too Balky, Mr President?"]

[Text] [Kenntemich] How important is the visit of the U.S. President, particularly after the week-long irritations between Bonn and Washington because of the missile quarrel?

[Weizsaecker] George Bush's first visit as President and the talks with him show that the German-U.S. relationship is based on a firm foundation despite some arguments about technical matters.

We know him as a reliable and experienced Atlantic friend and partner. He is highly welcome to us as President.

[Kenntemich] In Denmark you yourself intervened in the debate about the missiles. Why?

[Weizsaecker] For 20 years the bases of the alliance have been defense and detente. Both together create the security that we need.

This and nothing else is what I advocated at an important time for us, like the FRG Government itself.

[Kenntemich] What do you say about the fact that with the new Bush proposals the West has again taken the initiative?

[Weizsaecker] I welcome this very much.

[Kenntemich] U.S. politicians accuse us of being too balky and—in view of the Care packages after the war—ungrateful....

[Weizsaecker] The Care packages were an expression of sincere American generosity, but they were not packages of chains to make us dependent and submissive. We are free partners. And I do not think that there are any differences of opinion between Germans and Americans on what freedom and responsibility mean for their nations.

[Kenntemich] There is also criticism that the FRG is becoming a wanderer between the worlds....

[Weizsaecker] These are isolated voices. The governments in the West and the majority of the people on this and the other side of the Atlantic know: We are not wanderers between two worlds and we do not want any special German way. This would be a gross misinterpretation of our own interests, of our historical experience, and simply of our intelligence. However, at the dividing line between East and West it is our duty, even our alliance duty, to observe the developments in Eastern Europe particularly attentively and to point out the resulting chances. Like the Spanish, who look toward Latin America, and the Californians, who look toward the Pacific region, the Berliners always have the GDR in mind.

They will stick to their freedom and also to insisting that one must not forget the people in the GDR and Eastern Europe and their desire for freedom and self-determination.

[Kenntemich] Has Communism outlived itself in view of the sweeping changes in the East?

[Weizsaecker] Yes. Both the internal developments in the Warsaw Pact countries, such as Hungary or Poland, as well as the negotiations between East and West show

that Western positions and concepts of value are convincing and contagious. Human dignity and civil rights have to be enforced in Europe for the benefit of all people.

We must not lean back and be satisfied that we have already achieved them for ourselves.

[Kenntemich] How important are the U.S. soldiers stationed in our country?

[Weizsaecker] We are sharing tasks and burdens in the alliance. The presence of U.S. soldiers and families is an expression of this sharing. I think with respect and gratitude of the Americans in our country, who perhaps would also prefer to be at home.

NATO Summit Praised; Results Ambiguous

AU3105095389 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
31 May 89 p 1

[Herbert Kremp commentary: "The Topic Remains"]

[Text] George Bush has come to an enthusiastic and relieved Bonn. As one who mastered the summit and the crisis he has saved the FRG Government from a distress that threatened to lead to a lasting compulsive neurosis and to a distancing from the Western alliance that endangers German national interests.

Now everyone is breathing more easily, which is undoubtedly due to the fact that the aging alliance has found a surprisingly cohesive response to the chances and uncertainties of the change in the East. After the Brussels agreement, the United States is again considered the leading Western power. Bush proved to be a prudent, rationally calculating President, who in the end tackled the issue with determination.

Of course, in view of the mentality of Western Germany, of its coalition, and of the psychological condition, one has to ask how long the honeymoon that the alliance has been granted will last. The missile depression has been alleviated for the time being by the skill of the prudent American to propose comprehensive negotiations. But it has not been eradicated by its roots. The topic remains in the repertory, because no one can predict whether everything can really be implemented in Vienna in such a way and in such a short period as was agreed upon at the summit.

The considerably enhanced disarmament program may take much more time than the political patience in Bonn will last. However, the Brussels decision has stopped the "pushing for missiles." The speculations concerning a zero-option have been set off course—what remains to the Germans is only the possibility to say "no" to modernization once again in 1992. What the world will be like until then lies, however, in the flickering red stars.

Summit Commentary: 'Exceeds All Expectations'
AU3105101389 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 31 May 89 p 1

[Karl Feldmeyer commentary: "A Success of the Alliance"]

[Text] The result of the NATO summit in Brussels exceeds all expectations. The heads of state and government of the alliance were able to do something that was hardly expected by anyone: They agreed on an overall concept that has been disputed for 2 years. With this they clarified the further course of the alliance in disarmament policy and also the disputed question of including short-range nuclear missiles. The danger of a deep political rift within NATO has thus been averted, at least for the time being. The conflict about a third zero option has been toned down; the only question is whether this will last.

The overall result also includes the approval of the new disarmament proposals made by U.S. President Bush. The approval of all alliance members is an important precondition for presenting them in Vienna, where NATO and the Warsaw Pact are negotiating the disarmament of their conventional forces between the Atlantic and the Urals. Bush's proposal will not only extend the negotiation mandate. The announced readiness to negotiate not only on the elimination of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and guns, but also to include combat aircraft, military helicopters, and troop strengths in the disarmament efforts, corresponds to the demand of the Warsaw Pact, which, for its part, has taken over central Western ideas. All this will have to be thoroughly studied. However, the positive political impulse given in Brussels to the disarmament efforts is undisputed.

Even more important than this may be the political effect of the summit on the Western public: that it is now NATO that is pressing ahead for progress in disarmament—and not only Gorbachev. Not long ago the Soviet declaration of intent to implement a first disarmament stage by 1997 caused skepticism in the West, which showed the long periods of time the alliance used to have in mind. A change has taken place in this respect: Bush, and with him the entire alliance, is now striving to complete a first step toward conventional disarmament by 1992 or 1993. NATO even intends to come to a corresponding agreement in Vienna within 6 to 12 months. It is doubtful whether this will be possible.

However, this does not change anything in the fact that it was correct to act in this way. Because what is necessary is to correct the impression—that is fatal for NATO—that it accepts Gorbachev's disarmament offers only with inner reluctance. If this impression has perhaps been unfounded to date, it has been eliminated altogether by the Brussels decisions.

Thus, the Brussels conference not only exerts pressure on the responsible NATO bodies, which now quickly have to agree on precise formulations which the alliance needs for the Vienna negotiations. Above all, the summit has changed the situation of the Soviet leadership. So far, Gorbachev has been able to appear in the pose of the man who is pressing for concrete responses to his offer. The Brussels decisions now offer the Western alliance a chance to win back the initiative in the competition for the more credible disarmament policy—which, at the same time, is also a competition for support by public opinion—and to bring Gorbachev into the position of one who has to react.

However, this presupposes that the things approved and decided "on principle" by the heads of state and government of the NATO states will now be implemented without delay in an expanded Western proposal for the Vienna negotiations. There must not be any new delays. British and French reservations against including combat aircraft in the negotiations show—and this became clear in Brussels—that in this respect concern is not unfounded. NATO also has to wish for rapid success in Vienna, because this may lead to a relativizing of the differences of opinion on the issue of a third zero option, differences which have not been overcome in Brussels.

Concerning this issue, the result is ambivalent. On the one hand, NATO sets itself the goal of arriving at a partial reduction of short-range missiles. This means that complete elimination, that is, another zero-option, is not intended. On the other hand, the fact remains that the decision on whether the Lance missile will be replaced by a new one will have to be made in 1992—this was steadfastly advocated by Foreign Minister Genscher. However, renouncing modernization would equal a third zero option. The resulting dangers to the alliance cannot be predicted.

This shows that NATO will also have to deal with the questions of strategy and nuclear deterrence in the future. This need not impair the satisfaction at the achievements. Even though the Brussels conference has not eliminated all differences, it has shown what this alliance of independent states can still do 4 decades after its founding, if a crisis threatens to turn into a threat to its existence. The summit participants may be proud of the result of Brussels. This particularly applies to President Bush, who restored to the United States its leading role at this summit. At its anniversary meeting, NATO has shown itself to be much more lively than most people would have thought possible.

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